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Summary 
 
A discourse that portrays the Palestinian refugee as a suffering but struggling stateless 
person who has return to Palestine as his or her ultimate goal is dominating both in 
academic research and in Palestinian politics today. 
 
By the use of data collected in Wihdat Camp in Amman in 2009, this study argues 
that not only the Palestinian elite but also those who live in refugee camps have 
started defining themselves as Jordanian citizens, and that this is contributing to the 
development of a hybrid Palestinian-Jordanian identity. This means that the image of 
the Palestinian refugee that is dominates both in the academic and in the Palestinian 
political discourse only to a small extent fits the large group of Palestinian refugees 
who are Jordanian citizens.  
 
The study shows that the hybrid Palestinian-Jordanian identity is manifested in the 
camp Palestinians’ attitudes to the Right of Return and in changes in their marriage 
preferences. Although the camp refugees in Jordan still consider return to Palestine to 
be the right of every Palestinian refugee regardless of their juridical status in their 
host countries, they no longer see return as an option for themselves. This is expres-
sed by changes in choice of marriage partner. While a partner from the same village 
or family was the preferred choice for the first generations of refugees, the preferred 
choice today is a ‘stranger’; someone from outside the family and village circle. Cho-
osing a ‘stranger’ is an important strategy for enhancing the family networks and 
bettering their possibilities in Jordan, something that again contributes to greater 
integration and a reinforcement of the hybrid Palestinian-Jordanian identity. 
 
The development of a hybrid Palestinian-Jordanian identity takes place in an 
environment of increasing polarisation between Jordanians of East Bank and Pale-
stinian origin and of growing East Bank Jordanian nationalism. Thus, unless this iden-
tity is accepted by the East Bank Jordanians, it will not necessarily lead to Jordan 
developing into a more homogenous state. It may just as well develop into a bi-
national state with two distinct national groups that both consider themselves to be 
Jordanian citizens with full rights.        
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Anti-Palestinian hooliganism and slogans denigrating the 
Palestinian origins of both the Queen and the Crown 
Prince led to the cancellation of a July 17 soccer game 
between the rival Faisali and Wahdat clubs, who traditio-
nally represent the East Banker and Palestinian communi-
ties, respectively. Matches between the two teams have a 
long history of violence, but the specific digs at the 
royal family marked a new low. The clubs have been fined 
and their fans publicly chastised, yet official media 
reporting and commentary has been noticeably thin. The 
game exposed the growing rift between East Bankers and 
Palestinians in Jordan. The King’s silence on the event 
is noteworthy, as is a reluctance among our contacts to 
discuss the issue.1 
 
 
The tension between the two main communities in Jordan is nothing new. It has been 
a prevailing factor in Jordanian domestic politics since the influx of Palestinian refu-
gees after the war in 1948. This tension became more acute with the Jordanian disen-
gagement from the West Bank in 1988, as Jordan was no longer divided in a Pale-
stinian (West Bank) and predominantly Jordanian (East Bank) entity. Even though the 
East Bank had been inhabited by a mix of Palestinians and East Jordanians since 
1948, the fact that the Jordanian territory now was confined to the East Bank and that 
all Palestinian and East Bank Jordanians now lived on the same piece of land made 
the need to define what it means to be Jordanian more urgent, a need that was 
reinforced by the economic changes and regional peace making that upset the delicate 
balance between the two groups. The political liberalization initiated in 1989 gave the 
inter-communal tensions more public space, and issues of identity and citizenship 
were for the first time openly debated in the Jordanian media. The main line of 
contention in the ‘citizenship and identity-discourse’ that followed was the question 
of whether or not it is possible to be a ‘real’ Jordanian citizen without renouncing 
one’s Palestinian national identity. Out of the debate emerged a ‘nationalist’ and a 
‘pluralist’ point of view of what Jordanian citizenship means. The debate also led to 
increased polarisation between the Palestinian and East Bank Jordanians, and to a 
strengthening of Jordanian nationalist sentiments. 
                                                
1 Cable sent from the American embassy in Amman to US Secretary of State on July 23, 2009. 
Published by Wikileaks December 6, 2010. 
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In Jordan, football is not just football. It is an arena where political discontent is 
displayed. Beneath what seems like ordinary fan antagonism lie some unresolved 
questions: What does it mean to be a Jordanian? Who is a true Jordanian citizen? This 
study addresses these questions, mainly from the point of view of the Palestinians 
living in Wihdat refugee camp in Amman. 
 
In the early 1990s the Palestinians who lived in, or had recently left the refugee camps 
had a strong Palestinian identity, partly defined in opposition to or hostility to a Jor-
danian identity. The Palestinian middle class of small merchants and low-level gov-
ernment employees also had a strong Palestinian identity, but they felt comfortable 
expressing at least some form of Jordanian identity, or at least loyalty to the king. 
Only the Palestinian economic elite saw no dilemma or contradiction in defining 
themselves both as Palestinian and Jordanian (Brand 1995: 49). 
 
This study argues that today the Palestinian-Jordanian identity that was earlier con-
fined to the Palestinian Jordanian elite also can be found among the Palestinians 
living in refugee camps in Jordan.  
 
Although there is a number of studies on Palestinian identity in Jordan (Destremau 
1994, 1995, Jaber 1995, 1996, 2006, Farah 1999, Hart 2002, 2004), and on citizenship 
in the Middle East (Davis 1995, 1997, Butenschon et al. 2000), Nanes (2003) is the 
only publication that to my knowledge deals explicitly with the relationship between 
citizenship and national identity. Nanes traces the citizenship and identity-discourse 
that developed after the political liberalization in 1989. Her study shows how the 
heated debates between nationalists and pluralists over definitions of who is truly a 
Jordanian put citizenship to the forefront of the debate, and how an opening for civil 
society activism offered possibilities for putting Jordanian citizenship to use. Nanes 
argues that it is not the juridical status per se that creates a feeling of citizenship, but 
rather the active use of this status, and she argues that in Jordan active use of citizen-
ship has influences the citizens’ national identities.  
 
Nanes has collected her data through examination of documents, interviews with elite 
Palestinians and Jordanians and through observing the activities of a popular cam-
    9 
paign that worked to eliminate honour crimes in Jordan. Apart from a survey on 
Palestinian camp dwellers’ opinions on the level of integration between the Pale-
stinians and Jordanians, conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies at the 
University of Jordan, Nanes does not address issues that concern the refugee camps 
and their inhabitants.  
 
In this study I show how the inhabitants of Wihdat camp have been influenced by the 
citizenship and identity-discourse. Whereas they earlier saw their Jordanian citizen-
ship as a mere commodity, the camp dwellers today have acquired a feeling of Jor-
danianness that they associated with their Jordanian citizenship. This has led to the 
development of what I call a hybrid Palestinian-Jordanian identity.    
Definitions 
 
The terminology used to label the different groups living in Jordan is confusing. This 
study varies between the terms ‘Palestinians’ and ‘Palestinian Jordanians’, ‘Jordan-
ians’ and ‘East Bank Jordanians’, depending on whether or not it is obvious what 
category I am addressing. All these terms refer to inhabitants of Jordanian who hold 
full Jordanian citizenship. When I talk about Palestinians without citizenship, this is 
explicitly mentioned.  
 
The term ‘Palestinian refugee’ is complicated. The vast majority of Palestinian 
Jordanians are refugees or descendents of refugees, and approximately one in five 
Jordanian citizen, regardless of origin, is a registered UNRWA refugee (al-Hamarneh 
2002a: 188). As his study shows, this does not mean that they all consider themselves 
as refugees. Because it is not my task to decide if someone should be defined as a 
refugee or not, and because all the informants in this study are UNRWA registered 
refugees, I will not use the term ‘refugee’ unless there is a specific reason to do so. 
For the same reason I will avoid the term ‘Palestinian camp refugees’, and instead use 
‘Palestinians living in refugee camps’, ‘Palestinian camp dwellers’ or simply ‘camp 
dwellers’.  
 
Jordanians who are not of Palestinian origin are commonly termed as ‘Trans-
jordanians’ or ‘East Bank Jordanians’. In this study I use the latter term. 
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The organisation of the study 
 
In addition to this introduction, this thesis consists of five main chapters and a 
conclusion.  
 
Chapter two addresses some methodological and ethical aspects of the study. It 
mainly deals with difficulties and limitations I met during my fieldwork, different 
sampling strategies, advantages and disadvantages to different forms of interviews, 
language issues, and interpretation and analysis of the material. It also addresses some 
ethical dilemmas I encountered during the fieldwork.  
 
Chapter three introduces a question that runs through this study: Has the citizenship 
and identity-discourse and the Jordanian nationalists’ demand of Palestinian loyalty to 
Jordan led to a strengthening of the Palestinian Jordanians minority identity, or has it 
contributed to strengthening their Palestinian-Jordanian identity? The chapter argues 
that Jordan is still in a post-colonial process of searching for a national identity and 
that the citizenship and identity discourse that developed in Jordan from the early 
1990s is a stage in this process. This discourse has led to a further polarisation 
between the Palestinian and East Bank Jordanians, a development that has also been 
enhanced by ambivalent state policies toward the Palestinian Jordanians.  
 
Chapter four consists of three parts. The first part gives a historical presentation of 
Wihdat camp and shows how the inhabitants relate to the changes that have taken 
place in the camp. The second part outlines how the Jordanian state in different ways 
control the camp and its inhabitants, while the third part discusses different forms of 
formal and informal discrimination the Palestinians feel subjected to. The chapter 
argues that a state strategy of de-Palestinisation of Wihdat camp through opening it up 
and integrating it physically into the city of Amman has been successful, but that this 
strategy at the same time has led to an ‘us and them’-mentality in the camp, 
something that in combination with a strong feeling of discrimination contributes to 
slow down the process of de-Palestinisation. 
 
Chapter five opens with a discussion of what I consider to be two hegemonic discour-
ses on the Palestinian refugees and argues that these discourses have not taken the fact 
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that most Palestinian refugees in Jordan are Jordanian citizens into consideration. The 
chapter argues that citizenship has influenced the camp refugees’ views on the Right 
of Return and that their identities have changed from Palestinian nationals with Jor-
danian citizenship to a more hybrid identity that comprises elements of both Jor-
danianness and Palestinianness. This is especially evident among the youngest gene-
ration. The chapter ends with a discussion on the limits of Jordanian citizenship. It 
focuses on arbitrary abolition of citizenship and possible consequences of a future 
peace agreement between Israel, the Palestinians and the Arab states in the region. 
 
Chapter six argues that the identity changes presented in chapter five have affected 
the marriage patterns of the camp refugees, and that this further strengthens their 
hybrid Palestinian-Jordanian identity.  
 
The conclusion asks in which direction Jordan is going. Will it become a more united 
country, or will the polarisation continue to increase? It argues that a strengthening of 
the Palestinians’ Jordanian identity is in itself not sufficient to bridge the increasing 
gap between the two communities, it also needs to be accepted by East Bank Jordan-
ians. The conclusion presents some issues that need to be addressed and solved in 
order to achieve this acceptance.        
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Chapter 2: Methodical approaches and ethical implications 
 
The method used in this study, fieldwork with semi-structured interviews and 
participant observation, is widely used for gathering qualitative data for the purpose 
of understanding social phenomena. However, like with any other research method, 
there is no possibility of affirming the reliability and transferability of the results 
achieved without making the foundation of the knowledge explicitly known 
(Thagaard 2009: 11). The first part of this chapter deals with the development of my 
methodical approach. It discusses some choices I made and consequences of these. 
The second part looks at some ethical aspects of the method used, especially in rela-
tion to the politically sensitive situation the Palestinian Jordanians live under. 
Methodical approach 
Choosing the field 
The data for this study was gathered in Amman, mainly in Wihdat camp, from 
September to December 2009. My initial plan was to conduct fieldwork in a 
Palestinian village on the occupied West Bank where I lived in the spring of 2008. All 
preparations including the project description were done with this in mind. However, 
when I wanted to renew my visa for Israel after two months of intensive Arabic 
studies in Palestine, my papers from the University of Oslo and my student identity 
card did not convince Border Security that I was actually a student, and I was denied 
entry and had to go back to Amman.  
 
I decided not to appeal the denial of entry, and to instead focus on finding a new 
project and make the most of the time I had left. After consultations with my 
supervisor in Oslo, I decided to conduct my fieldwork in one of the Palestinian 
refugee camps in Amman. I bought a map and chose the refugee camp closest to 
where I lived; Wihdat camp. Later this random choice turned out to be very useful, as 
it gave me access to informants with different juridical statuses in Jordan.  
Entering the field – the importance of being introduced 
Because of the unexpected way I ended up in Jordan, I had made no contacts in 
advance. From previous experience in the Middle East I knew the importance of 
being introduced, and I realised I had to use all available methods to create a network 
for myself as quickly as possible. Through the use of online networks and contacting 
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old friends and acquaintances from previous visits to the Middle East, and by 
contacting the UNRWA2 and various Jordanian NGOs, I tried to find a way in to the 
camp. Taking formal contact with NGOs yielded no results, possibly because I was 
and unknown with no one to introduce me. Through a friend working for the 
UNRWA I was put in contact with a Palestinian student from Gaza who was herself 
doing research in a different refugee camp. This student volunteered to help me both 
to get a research permit from the Department of Palestinian Affairs (DPA) and to try 
to find a way into the camp. She did not personally know anyone in Wihdat but she 
had friends who did, and through this chain of acquaintances I was no longer a 
stranger. Thus, the student functioned as a ‘gatekeeper’ (May 1993: 42) for me.  
 
As I had worked as a language teacher for immigrants in Norway earlier, my plan at 
the outset was to volunteer as an English teacher in the camp. The purpose of this was 
twofold; first to have a pretext to get in contact with people, and second to give 
something of value in exchange for the time and information people gave me. Thus, 
when I went to the camp for the first time, I suggested this to one of the activity cen-
tres. They seemed enthusiastic and said they would call me back. However they never 
did so I started going to the camp regularly to check if there was any development in 
the “English teacher” project. In the end they were not able to decide what they 
wanted me to do, but it turned out to be a valuable exercise all the same. I got to know 
people in the camp, and one day, after about three weeks of going to the camp I was 
invited home to a woman for lunch, and to the wedding of another woman’s daughter. 
After this is became easier to ask for appointments for interviews. I believe this 
happened both because people started to know me better and because they by now 
knew a bit more about my project. In short, the weeks spent visiting the camp without 
making interviews gained me the trust I needed to be let in (Thagaard 2009: 61).  
The sampling strategy 
From the beginning I wanted to concentrate on ‘ordinary’ people, not community 
leaders or other people in power. I also knew that I wanted to do some kind of gene-
ration comparison. The first set of informants was a ‘convenience sample’, defined as 
“a strategic sample in the sense that the informants represent characteristics which are 
                                                
2 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
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relevant for our research, and the method of choosing informants is based on their 
availability to the researcher” (Thagaard 2009: 56, my translation). The informants 
were all recruited by and from two community centres that I had gained access to. 
The informants were all women of about the same age (from 25 to 35) and from more 
or less the same social strata. Two had left the camp when their families’ economies 
were strong enough to move to more comfortable neighbourhoods. After about five 
interviews I reached a saturation point (Thagaard 2009: 59); the information started 
repeating itself. After a while I also came to understand that these informants all to 
some degree were approved by the DPA in advance. This got me worried about the 
quality of the data collected, especially concerning potentially sensitive topics like the 
relationship between Palestinians and Jordanians. As I needed to talk to both younger 
and older people, people in less comfortable economical situations and because I also 
wanted to interview people who were willing to talk about Palestinian political 
activity in the camps, I decided to look for informants myself, outside the two centres.  
 
By this time I had a better overview of the activities in the camp, and I asked for 
permission to join some handicraft classes for younger women. Through this I ended 
up with a different set of informants, through a process resembling the snowball 
method (Thagaard 2009: 56). I tried to avoid the potential problem of getting a one-
sided sample by specifically asking people if they knew someone who remembered 
Palestine, someone with a specific social status, age etc. Through this I met ‘ordinary’ 
people with no connection to the DPA, the UNRWA or other officially recognized 
organisations.  
 
Through a chain of people who trusted each other but who I never personally met, I 
was also put in contact with undercover political activists. This turned out to have 
potential ethical consequences, something I will address in the second part of this 
chapter.  
 
I regard my sample to be reasonably varied when it comes to age, social, martial and 
juridical status. However, there is a clear gender bias as all the main interviewees are 
women. Throughout the fieldwork I tried, through sisters, mothers and wives, to get in 
contact with men. The reply was always a polite ‘yes’, but it never materialised. I 
believe this is due to the strong gender segregation in Wihdat. Thus, the men I did talk 
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to were all political or official representatives or husbands sitting in on interviews 
with their wives.  
The gathered material 
Apart from field notes and informal conversations with individuals and organisations, 
I have conducted 14 semi-structured interviews that in some instances turned out to be 
closer to focused interviews (May 1993: 93). The average time for an interview was 
about three hours. Mostly there was more than one person present, sometimes up to 
five, all of them engaged in the conversation. All in all I have interviewed about thirty 
people. In addition I informally talked to about 35 individuals in-depth. Outside the 
camp I had formal and informal meetings with the UNRWA field office and the DPA. 
Among the organisations I met inside the camp were a women’s centre, a kinder-
garten, an Islamic charity, a handicap centre, a health clinic, a fitness studio for 
women, and an underground political party. I also visited and was given tours of 
Husayn and Jarash camps, and I went to visit friends in Hittin camp. As I took part in 
and observed ordinary social situations, I consider my method to be one of semi-
structured interviews with participant observation (Fangen 2004: 101ff).  
The questionnaire and the interviews 
After the first few visits to the camp I drafted a questionnaire and conducted a trial 
interview in Arabic with a Palestinian friend. It turned out that I lacked some Arabic 
words and expressions and that I had to rephrase some questions, delete others and 
add some new. The first actual version included four main topics: Family and 
marriage, economy, the camp and identity.  
 
The aims for the interviews was to get as much concrete information as possible about 
the role these topics play in the lives of the interviewees, in order to better understand 
their attitudes and life choices. My ideal was for interviewees to talk about the 
subjects in terms of their own frames of reference as much as possible. This allows 
the meanings and interpretations that the individual attributes to events and 
relationships to be understood and thus provides possibilities for a greater under-
standing of the subject’s point of view. In order to live up to this ideal my approach 
was to make the questions as open as possible, close to the method of the ‘focused 
interview’. However, it is not correct to label the interviews ‘focused’. I used a 
detailed questionnaire with introductory questions focusing on facts like age, marital 
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status etc. and during the interviews I made sure that as many as possible of the 
questions were addressed either embedded in the conversation or explicitly stated. 
Thus it is more correct to label the interviews ‘semi-structured’ (May 1993: 92ff). 
 
An advantage of using semi-structured and focused interviews is that they have the 
ability to challenge the preconceptions of the researcher and that they also give the 
flexibility needed to change both the questionnaire and the way questions are asked 
during the fieldwork (Rosmer 2005: 61, May 1993: 93). This was important for my 
fieldwork. For instance I realized that asking direct questions about economy was not 
fruitful, as it seemed to be shameful to talk about among poor informants and 
uninteresting for informants who were better off. Integrating economy into 
conversations about marriage gave more information. On the other hand on some of 
the other topics my questions were too vague and general and I had to change them to 
to avoid getting idealized rather than realistic representations of people’s lives. Also 
due to the method of asking broad, open-ended questions I discovered two major 
shortcomings in my questionnaire. The first concerned the informants’ attitudes to the 
Right of Return; the second concerned the role of religion in people’s lives. The first 
of these topics turned out to be crucial for this study. This shows how important it is 
to give the interviewee the chance to talk about what is most important for her and not 
just what the interviewer believes is important.  
Using tape recorder or taking notes? 
There are some obvious advantages to tape recording. As all the information is 
preserved it is possible to go back to check and double check for mistakes, and quotes 
will be more precise. Since it is impossible to write down all the information given in 
an interview, taking notes instead of using a tape recorder will reduce the amount of 
gathered data. Taking notes also reduces personal contact between the researcher and 
the interviewee (Thagaard 2009: 102). Despite these shortcomings I chose not to tape 
record interviews or conversations. Since I did not know the interviewees or the social 
and political situation in the refugee camp well I was afraid that it would be difficult 
for people to trust me enough to be open if I recorded what they said. I got this 
suspicion confirmed on one occasion when I was engaged in an informal conversation 
with two informants. As they suddenly switched from general subjects to politics they 
anxiously asked me not to write down their names (I was taking notes). When I told 
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them I never did and that I was always taking notes in Norwegian they were clearly 
relieved. I compensated as much as possible for the loss of data by writing up the 
interviews as soon as possible after conducting them. The possibility I had to go back 
and double-check with the informants also reduced the chance of misquotes and 
misunderstandings. I believe that by not using a tape recorder I gained more trust and 
it made people more relaxed. As this resulted in some additional information I believe 
the advantages to this method were greater than the losses. 
Time spent in the field 
All in all I spent three months in Jordan. I first went to Wihdat two weeks after I 
arrived, and the first contact with the people who later became my informants 
happened after about one month. All the interviews were conducted during the last 
month of the stay.  
 
An important reason why I was able to gain trust and access relatively quickly was 
my previous knowledge of Palestine. I had previously lived two years in different 
places in the West Bank and travelled extensively in Israel and on the Golan Heights. 
This meant that I had been to many of the places people came from originally and that 
I had a reasonably good knowledge of Palestinian culture. This plus the fact that I 
speak Arabic made me more of an ‘insider’, or at least not a total stranger. This was 
especially important during an interview I conducted with a political activist. At first 
she was wary of my motivation but after some time we discovered that we had 
common acquaintances on the West Bank. After this she became less sceptical and 
her answers were more open.  
Language 
After 2 ½ years of Arabic studies at the university of Oslo and three years living in 
different places in the Middle East, my command of Arabic is reasonably good. 
However, situations where I had to ask for rephrasing and clarification sometimes 
appeared during the interviews. This was to a certain degree compensated for by the 
possibility I had to meet the interviewees several times and the fact that I sometimes 
conducted the interviews in two or three parts. Despite this problem and because of 
the limited time and lack of preparations caused by having to change both the site and 
the theme of the project, I chose not to spend time looking for an interpreter. 
However, on three occasions I was able to bring with me native Arabic speakers who 
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were also fluent in English. These interviews made it clear to me that I both gained 
and lost something by not using a translator. For one thing, I lost the possibility of 
going into detail on certain subjects and I had fewer opportunities to ask follow-up 
questions because it was sometimes too complicated or too tiring. Another loss was 
the explanations of cultural praxis and quick updates on historical background that a 
good translator can supply (Borchgrevink 2003:97). On the other hand when the 
interviews were conducted through interpreters, direct contact with the interviewees 
was lost and I did not have the same control over the interviews. The attention quickly 
shifted from me to the interpreter and I had to work hard to keep focus on the topics I 
wanted addressed. I believe that my efforts to speak Arabic was a signal to the 
informants that I had a genuine interest in them and their culture, something that 
added to the trust I was given (Rosmer 2005: 56).  
The analysis of the material 
Because the gathered material is not very extensive, only about 90 pages, I chose not 
to use a computer programme to categorise the data. Already during the fieldwork I 
had an idea about which were the most important topics, and the first thing I did when 
I started analysing the data was to divide it into these topics by cutting and pasting the 
original texts into new documents. This enabled me to compare the answers of the 
different informants on the same topics. I then looked at the material again, this time 
asking myself what the different statements and stories were examples of or what they 
might represent. I then started to generate subcategories and combine these in dif-
ferent ways to find connections between them. From this four main themes emerged 
that mainly correspond to the chapters I ended up with. In other words, I have had a 
Grounded Theory-inspired approach, an inductive method where theory is developed 
from data rather than the opposite; a deductive method where a hypothesis is tested 
through the gathering of data (May 1993: 105, 112). As I had no hypothesis in 
advance, the latter method was out of the question. However, after the initial 
categorising and analysis of the data, I included other sources of theory, namely other 
research done on similar cases or incidents in order to validate my research, and to 
develop it further (Thagaard 2009: 189f).  
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Ethical implications of fieldwork with participant observation 
 
The remaining part of this chapter will address some ethical aspects connected to my 
fieldwork. These have partly to do with general concerns of fieldwork and the 
treatment of informants in a politically sensitive area, and partly with specific 
situations that occurred during my fieldwork. I will also address one situation where I 
unknowingly might have put others at risk.  
Contact with local authorities 
From the beginning I was as open as possible about who I was and the nature of my 
research. On the first visits I brought with me the Palestinian student from Gaza. She 
had a clear understanding of what I was doing and of research ethics and I believe she 
was able to convey this to the people we met, many of which later became informants. 
I made it clear to each interviewee that she was free not to participate and that she was 
free to withdraw from the interview at any time (NESH3 2006: 12f). However, as 
NESH points out concerning research in other cultures,  
[t]he requirement regarding the consent of individuals that live in the society 
being studied must be combined with knowledge about and respect for local 
traditions and the powers that be. Insofar as possible, researchers should 
cooperate with the local inhabitants, members of the culture in question, and 
their representatives and local authorities (NESH 2006: 24). 
Trying to cooperate with and gain the confidence of the local inhabitants and at the 
same time cooperate with local authorities represented by the DPA and the Camp 
Service Committee (CSC) led to both practical problems and ethical dilemmas4. 
 
After obtaining a research permit from the central office of the DPA in Amman, I was 
told to go to the DPA office in Wihdat to present myself. When I got there a few days 
later, I was introduced to the director and as I was explaining the nature of my 
research, two young men entered the room and sat down without introducing them-
selves or acknowledging that I was in the room. I later found out that they were 
working for the CSC, and that they at the same time were representatives of the secret 
police. When the director asked me if my research was ‘political’ I was in doubt how 
                                                
3 The National Committee for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences and the Humanities in Norway 
4 The DPA and their executive arm in the camps, the CSC, are controlling life in the camps in many 
ways. I elaborate on this in chapter four. 
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to answer. After all, what does ‘political’ mean? I had no intention of asking for 
political affiliations, about opinions on the political situation in Jordan, the current 
regime or the royal family. However, being a Palestinian refugee has meant and still 
means living a life close to politics both as victims of it actors in it, and the political 
situation both in Jordan, Palestine and internationally has been and still is decisive for 
the everyday lives of the Palestinian Jordanians. Thus, when asking about identity, 
marriage, economy or the future it is impossible not to touch on to politics. My 
dilemma was: Should I elaborate on this and risk being stamped as ‘political’ and 
maybe lose my research permit or should I just stick to the narrower definition of 
‘politics’ and answer that my research was not political? I opted for the last solution. 
In the actual interviews I avoided asking any questions that could be potentially 
uncomfortable or even risky to talk about. Instead, through asking open-ended 
questions I left the interviewees free to decide for themselves how political they 
wanted to make their answers. In this way I believe I both respected the DPA’s wish 
for me not to enter into politics and the informants’ right to express themselves as 
freely as they wanted or felt was safe.  
 
A second problem appeared after the meeting with the DPA. As the two silent young 
men took me to the CSC for a briefing on their tasks in the camps, they informed me 
that they were going to be my guardians in the camp, for my own protection. I would 
have to report to them every time I entered the camp and have one of them with me at 
all times. They then took me on a tour of the main social institutions of the camp and I 
quickly realised that having them with me would make my fieldwork impossible for 
two reasons. The first because it is highly impolite to bring a young man on a visit to 
a woman and the second because I was afraid that people would not talk freely if I 
was considered to be somehow connected to the state’s security apparatus. After the 
tour I managed to convince the men that I did not need protection, and I promised to 
call them if I needed anything, and give them my schedule when it was ready. They 
agreed and I believed the problem was solved. However, when I needed a permission 
from them to teach English in the camp, they made the process very slow and at the 
same time informed me that I could teach at their centre without a permit. I politely 
refused. I did not want to be associated with them, I wanted to teach people who 
could also be informants and I wanted to keep my promise to the first people I had 
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contacted. This tug-of-war between the CSC and me over the permit to teach lasted 
throughout the fieldwork. 
Confidentiality 
Most of the interviewees smiled and laughed when I assured them that they would be 
unrecognizable in the finished study. They did not consider their opinions contro-
versial, and did not see the point of depersonalization. However, even though I 
explained my project and how I wanted to use the information as thoroughly as 
possible to all informants and others I met, I am not in a position to judge whether or 
not they were fully aware of what the information they gave me could be used for. For 
instance, in this study I position the informants in the ongoing debate over what 
Jordanian citizenship implies and what being Jordanian means. My study can be read 
as a contribution to the debate over if the Palestinian refugees in Jordan should accept 
compensation and resettle in Jordan or insist on the Right of Return. Some of the 
informants’ views on these topics, although not controversial in the ‘unofficial’ 
debate, are highly contentious, if not tabooed, in the official debate. I have no right to 
position the informants as individuals in these sensitive debates. Therefore and in 
accordance with the principle of confidentiality within the social sciences (NESH 
2006), all names and identifiable characteristics have been left out or changed with 
pseudonyms. Given the nature of this study, I do not believe this has deprived the 
analysis of any significance.  
The informant who disappeared – Unknowingly putting others at risk 
On one occasion I might have put other people at risk. As mentioned above, I 
managed to get in contact with representatives of an underground political 
organisation working for the liberation of Palestine. We met for the first time in a flat 
far away from the camp where I explained what I wanted from them and why. After 
the meeting they agreed to help me by taking me to one of the leaders of the orga-
nisation, a woman living inside Wihdat. I explained that I was relatively well known 
in the camp and that they had to make sure there was no risk involved for them taking 
me there. I also specifically asked if we could enter the camp from a different place 
than I usually did. They assured me this was no problem and we agreed to meet again.  
 
We met after sunset some days later, outside the camp. Contrary to my wishes, we 
passed though the main street, something that made me feel very uncomfortable. I 
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was assured that this was not a problem and we went to the informant’s house. The 
interview turned out to be a very long one and we decided to stop half way and finish 
it another time. Outside the camp I agreed with the contact to keep in touch and we 
went our separate ways. After a few days I called the contact but there was no answer. 
This went on for about a week, and I decided to carefully check if something might 
have happened to him. Although I knew several people who were in a position to 
contact him, nobody managed to get in touch and I decided not to try and contact him 
again. I never found out what happened and I fear that their contact with me has 
caused problems with the security apparatus.   
Concluding remarks 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to document and explain my fieldwork and my 
methodological approach. The data collection has been based on semi-structured, 
sometimes bordering on focused interviews supported by participant observation and 
informal in-depth conversations. The interviews were mainly conducted without 
interpreter, something I consider to have had both positive and negative consequences 
for the data produced.  
 
My recruiting strategies have been varied but come close to the ‘snowball-method’ 
(Thagaard 2009: 56). Because I had several starting points, the final list of informants 
is varied concerning social status, age, level of education and juridical status in 
Jordan. There is however a clear bias in favour of female informants.  
 
The relatively short time in the field was to a large degree compensated for by my 
previous experiences from living and working in the Middle East, my knowledge of 
Palestinian history and culture and of the Arabic language. 
 
I have argued that my analytical strategy is best described as inductive but that I have 
also used deductive methods in the process of analysing the data as I have been 
inspired by other cases and theories in my interpretation of the material.  
 
During the fieldwork I encountered some ethical problems. I have especially pointed 
out the dilemma of dealing with the wishes and demands of the authorities on the one 
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hand and on the other hand needing the trust and cooperation of the population. I have 
also discussed the need for depersonalisation in a politically sensitive situation and 
the risk of unknowingly putting others at danger.   
    25 
Chapter 3: Jordanian identity and the citizenship debate 
 
Citizenship does not in itself presuppose equality, democracy or a vibrant civil 
society; it is basically a contract between the state and the people. It regulates the 
legal status of the individual inhabitants of a state and decides the level of individual 
political participation and access to public resources. In this perspective, citizenship is 
the organising principle of modern states (Butenschon 2000: 11). However, questions 
concerning democracy and good governance or the role of the state in different 
societal fields like the economy, models of political participation, rule of law etc. can 
only be addressed when there is an established agreement over who legitimately 
constitutes ‘the society’. The political situation when a state is established as a result 
of military conquest, territorial reorganisation or, as in the case of Jordan, of colonial 
design, is often one of instability and with competing groups struggling for territorial 
control and political power. The agreement over who constitutes the society can only 
be reached after the state is established, and the outcome of the struggles will 
determine who will constitute the political centre and who will be more or less 
excluded from influence in the emerging political system (Butenschon 2000: 4). In 
this chapter I argue that Jordan is still in a post-colonial process of defining who 
constitutes the society, and that the citizenship and identity discourse that has 
developed since the late 1980s is a part of this process. The chapter also introduces a 
question that is central in this study: Has the citizenship and identity-discourse and the 
Jordanian nationalists’ demand of Palestinian loyalty to Jordan led to a strengthening 
of the Palestinian Jordanians minority identity, or has it contributed to strengthening 
their Palestinian-Jordanian identity? 
Jordanian citizenship – an unsettled category 
 
Already in 1949 an article was added to the Jordanian law that stated that  
[a]ll those who at the time when this Law goes into effect habitually reside in 
Transjordan or in the Western part [of the Jordan] which is being 
administered by [the Kingdom], and who were holders of Palestinian 
citizenship, shall be deemed as Jordanians enjoying all rights of Jordanians 
and bearing all the attendant obligations (Kassim 2000: 207).  
In 1954, a new citizenship law that granted Jordanian citizenship to all Palestinians 
living in the West Bank and to refugees who had fled during the 1948 war was 
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passed. Since then and until 1988 most Palestinians in Jordan have been defined as 
Jordanians, entertaining full individual political, civil, economic and religious rights 
(Kassim 2000: 207). An important exception to this is the approximately 120 000 
refugees originally from the Gaza Strip, which up to 1967 was administered by Egypt. 
These people are eligible for temporary Jordanian passports, which do not entitle 
them to full citizenship rights such as the right to vote and employment with the 
government (UNRWA online 2009). 
 
After Jordan disengaged from the West Bank in 1988, Palestinians with permanent 
residency on the West Bank lost their citizenship rights and their five-year passports 
were replaced with two-year passports. These passports function as travel documents 
but they do not imply that the holder is a citizen of Jordan; their holders are de facto 
stateless. Davis estimates that around 750 000 Palestinians on the West Bank were 
affected by this (Davis 2000: 51, Davis 1997: 74, 77).  
 
From 1995 West Bank Palestinians were again issued five-year passports, visually 
indistinguishable from the passports carried by Jordanian citizens. However, these 
passports do not contain a national ID number and do not give the holders access to 
the civil, political, social and material resources of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
or the right of abode in the state of Jordan (Davis 1997: 8, 2000: 54).5 The reported 
number of non-citizens living in Jordan varies enormously, ranging from 349,933 
including non-Palestinian guest workers and other foreigners (Jordan Department of 
Statistics 2004) to about one million, only including holders of passports without a 
national ID number (Davis 1997: 77). The low official number is probably due to the 
fact that in the national censuses, holders of all kinds of Jordanian passports are 
counted as citizens even though they do not all have the same citizen’s rights6. Since 
the Gazans are the only ones without national ID number who are permanent residents 
of Jordan, they are the only ones who are counted separately. It is important to keep in 
mind this uncertainty of the numbers when one discusses Jordanian citizens of 
Palestinian origin.  
                                                
5 Some literature refers to ’national ID number’, while other refers to the ’yellow identity card’. In 
practice this means the same, since one cannot be granted a yellow card without having a national 
number. 
6 See appendix 1 for details. 
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Citizenship and nationality – what does it mean to be Jordanian? 
 
Davis (1997, 2000) distinguishes between ‘citizenship’ and ‘nationality’, defining 
citizenship as “a datum: a certificate regulating the relationship between the indi-
vidual and the state” and nationality as “a signifier of a collective identity or an 
imagined community” (Davis 1997: xiii). This definition fits well with how the older 
informants in this study describe their identity; they do not in any way link their 
citizenship and their national identity to the same physical and mental entity. Legally 
they are Jordanian citizens and enjoy full rights, while culturally and historically they 
are part of the Palestinian nation. However, it seems that Gubser’s observation that 
“[t]hose in the camps […] fundamentally see Jordanian citizenship as a convenience 
rather than an identity or a loyalty” (Gubser 1983: 15) is becoming less valid, and that 
a generation that feels if not loyalty to the Jordanian state, then at least some form of 
Jordanian identity, is coming of age. This does not imply that young Palestinians are 
substituting their Palestinian nationality for a Jordanian one but rather that they are 
developing a national identity that has room for being both Jordanian and Palestinian, 
a hybrid identity. In this perspective, Davis’ distinction between ‘citizenship’ and 
‘nationality’ becomes problematic, and Kymlicka and Norman provide a more useful 
perspective:  
At the individual level talk of a person’s ‘citizenship’ can refer to three 
distinct ideas or phenomena: (a) her status as a legal citizen, defined largely 
by a panoply of civil, political, and social rights as well as a relatively small 
number of duties (e.g. to obey the law, pay taxes, perform military service); 
(b) her identity as a member of one or more political communities, an identity 
that is often contrasted with her other more particular identities based on 
class, race, ethnicity, religion, gender, profession, sexual preference, etc.; or 
(c) her activity of civic virtue. […] These three ideas are conceptually and 
empirically linked in a variety of ways (Kymlicka and Norman 2000: 30f). 
Instead of distinguishing between citizenship and nationality, a person’s nationality or 
nationalities are included as a potential part of his or her citizenship. This opens up 
for a more flexible understanding of the relationship between the two, and a more 
comprehensive understanding of what national identity means. 
 
The third idea of citizenship; active participation in the polity, is central for the 
understanding of citizenship in this study. Nanes argues that it is through claiming 
one’s rights as a citizen and by taking part in the public discourse one develops a 
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sense of belonging to and identification with the political community (Nanes 2003: 
23). In the case of Jordan, al-Hamarneh disagrees and claims that the debate over 
loyalty and citizenship contributes to limit the Jordanian citizen identity of the 
Palestinians in Jordan:  
[In Jordan] the question of ‘loyalty’ is frequently discussed: to whom are 
Palestinians in Jordan more loyal, to Jordan or to Palestine, or, more 
specifically, to the Jordanian political system or to the PLO? This peculiar 
discussion can only strengthen the perception of guest and ‘minority’ status 
of the Palestinians, as well as increase East Jordanian xenophobia against 
them (al-Hamarneh 2004: 204). 
These contradicting views generate an important question that runs through this study: 
Does the polarisation between the two groups and the constant nationalist demand of 
Palestinian loyalty to Jordan necessarily strengthen the Palestinians’ minority identity 
or can it also contribute to strengthening their Jordanian identity? 
 
Regardless of one’s view on this point, the participation in civil society that to a 
certain extent was made possible with the political liberalisation from 1989 has been 
limited in pace with the stagnation of the liberalisation process. This stagnation might 
have a negative effect on the further development of the citizenship of the Palestinian 
Jordanians:  
[T]he exact rights citizens have will partly define both their citizenship status 
and identity, as well as the range of political and social activities available to 
them The form of citizenship identity they have will have an impact on their 
motivations to participate virtuously in civic and political activities; and so 
on. Similarly, if one of these aspects of citizenship is eroded, then the others 
will be affected as well (Kymlicka and Norman 2000: 30f). 
However, the effects of the open debate over citizenship and Jordanianness that was 
made possible by the liberalisation cannot easily be reversed even if the space for 
public expression has decreased since then. 
 
On the basis of this understanding of citizenship and with the different limitations to 
citizenship in Jordan in mind I will now present the debate over citizenship and 
Jordanianness that emerged after 1989. 
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The citizenship debate 
 
Although Palestinians were granted citizenship in 1950 and the vast majority of the 
Palestinians in Jordan today hold Jordanian citizenship, Jordanian society is divided 
along national lines. Palestinian Jordanians dominate the private sector while East 
Bank Jordanians control the public sector, including the army, state security services 
and the bureaucracy (Brand 1995: 48, Robins 2004: 3). This does not mean that 
Jordan started out having two groups with separate national identities. Neither does it 
mean that the country became bi-national in 1948 with its conquest of the West Bank 
and the subsequent granting of citizenship to the Palestinian refugees, as during this 
period, localized identities (city, family) and supra-national identities (Arab) were 
stronger forms of identity than state-level nationalism (Nanes 2003: 2). Rather, the 
distinct national identities of the Palestinian and East Bank Jordanians developed 
gradually.  
 
Influenced by growing anticolonial sentiments and ideologies in the Third World, an 
anticolonial current overtook Jordan in the mid 1950s, demanding complete 
independence from the British as well as democratic reforms. Although this 
movement did not reach its aim of democratic reforms, it resulted in the emergence of 
a Jordanian ‘self’, radically opposed to the British ‘other’. With the emergence of an 
increasing Palestinian national consciousness, the rise of the PLO and the Palestinian 
guerrilla movements in the 1960s, the need for a national redefinition became urgent, 
and after the Civil War in 1970-71 where much of the country’s elite backed the 
regime, the ‘other’ of the Jordanians changed from the British to the Palestinian 
Jordanians (Massad 2001: 12f). Thus, distinct Palestinian and Jordanian national 
identities emerged over time and are relatively recent developments. This emergence 
was mediated by a shared Jordanian citizenship:  
Although the national divide and the challenges it poses to the regime 
occupies much of the writing about Jordan, little attention has been paid to 
the simple fact that it is precisely because Palestinian Jordanians are Jorda-
nian citizens that the Jordanian situation is so complex. […] [T]hrough the 
granting of citizenship to Palestinians, Jordan made a commitment to them 
and created a unique challenge for itself. The question then becomes: how 
can these two national groups live peaceably in one country? (Nanes 2003: 
2f).  
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The relationship between the two communities has waxed and waned with changing 
political and economic circumstances, but tensions have always been a persistent if 
suppressed feature of domestic politics. These tensions were allowed a more open 
expression from 1989 when Jordan embarked on a path of political and economical 
liberalisation that opened the public sphere to discourse and also to a certain degree to 
participation in civil society (Brand 1995: 46, Nanes 2003: 4).  
 
The disengagement from the West Bank the year before had already given a push to 
forces that were asserting an exclusivist nationalism that excluded large segments of 
the population as non-Jordanian. These forces took the denationalisation of the West 
Bank Jordanians as evidence that not all Jordanian citizens belonged to the Jordanian 
nation (Massad 2001: 262). Thus, even if citizenship has been an issue in the debate 
over who is a Jordanian throughout the history of the state, the changes, debates and 
activities that took place after 1988, in combination with peacemaking in the region 
intensified the discussion of what citizenship means both in terms of identity and in 
terms of rights (Nanes 2003: 2f).  
 
Through these public discussions, two opposing views on who is truly a Jordanian 
and over the distribution of political and economical rights and privileges crystallised; 
the nationalist and the pluralist discourse. While the Jordanian nationalists give prim-
acy to national identity over juridical citizenship, the pluralists give primacy to juri-
dical citizenship over national identity. This battle between inclusive and exclusive 
definitions of Jordanian identity is inherently a battle over the status of Jordan’s citi-
zens of Palestinian origin (Nanes 2003: 1). While the pluralist discourse represented 
something fundamentally new in Jordan (Nanes 2003: ii), the nationalist discourse 
had roots in Jordanian history and politics, dating back to the anticolonial, nationalist 
movement mentioned above.     
The official discourse  
The regime’s politics toward the two national groups in Jordan has been, and still is, 
dominated by the balancing act that is characteristic for Jordanian politics in general, 
the aim of which is not ultimately to defend the notion of the nation-state but to 
defend the monarchy and keep it in power (al-Oudat 2010: 66). The basis of regime 
security has since the foundation of the state been the indigenous Jordanian tribes and 
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the army. Strategies of recruiting to power and awarding members of important tribes 
is crucial to the regime, something that has reinforced the connection between tribal 
affiliation and East Banker identity (Brand 1995: 48), indicating that there is a 
difference between Palestinian Jordanians and ‘real’ Jordanians. Even though the vast 
majority of the Palestinians in Jordan legally are Jordanian citizens, they are in the 
official discourse Palestinian refugees who are waiting to go home to Palestine 
(Nanes 2003: 139). Yet at the same time, the general strategy of Jordan has always 
been to integrate the Palestinian refugees in the socio-political structure of the country 
and to integrate the Palestinian refugee camps into municipal planning and construc-
tion (al-Hamarneh 2002a: 174). However, contrary to the perception of many Pale-
stinians, and despite strong evidence that the regime is not above exploiting and 
encouraging inter-communal tensions when it sees fit, the evidence suggests that the 
state’s goal has been less to impose an East Bank Jordanian identity on the Pale-
stinians than to create a hybrid Jordanian identity for both communities (Brand 1995: 
50, 57). 
 
It is important to be aware that the ethnical and the political divide not always concur. 
In the political discourse it seems like the identity divisions are clearly drawn, that 
‘Palestinian’ and ‘Jordanian’ are fixed and clearly demarcated communities. In 
reality, history and current facts on the ground show that this duality has never been 
that clearly marked (Nanes 2003: 138). It is not simply a matter of origin but also one 
of class and political standing. Since the foundations of the state, there has been 
Palestinians loyal to the Hashemites, and East Bank Jordanians who have opposed 
them. In the 1960s, some East Bank Jordanians were recruited to the Palestinian 
resistance movement (Brand 1995: 54). It is also important to note that although there 
is a strong nationalist movement in Jordan, East Bank exclusivist nationalists are a 
minority among East Bank Jordanians (Nanes 2003: 150).  
Two views on citizenship and national identity – the nationalists vs. the pluralists7 
The nationalist definition of who is a Jordanian stresses a nativist, East Bank identity 
that excludes Palestinians who arrived after 1948 from the political community. For 
nationalists, only national homogeneity can preserve loyalty to the state, and they 
                                                
7 This section is based on Nanes 2003: 141-153.  
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insist on linage membership in the titular nation as being the most important criteria 
for political inclusion. Palestinian loyalty to Jordan has always been suspect due to 
floating identity and conditional legitimacy. The attempts of Palestinian guerrilla 
groups to take over Jordan during the civil war of 1970-71 were to some a clear signal 
of the disloyalty of the Palestinian Jordanians.  
 
However, East Jordanian nationalists acknowledge the law and admit that the 
Palestinians legally are Jordanian citizens but insist on making distinctions based on 
national origin as the ‘real’ basis of citizenship. To the extent that Palestinians can 
become ‘real’ citizens, a demand is that they make the choice between remaining 
Palestinian or becoming Jordanian. For the nationalists this choice is related to the 
need for loyalty to the state. They see no difficulties with the loyalty of the Circassian 
and Chechen immigrants who arrived in the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th 
century. They believe these immigrants became integrated because they came to 
Jordan of their own free will, as opposed to the post-1948 refugees, who were forced 
to come to Jordan. Because they did not come to Jordan of their own free will, their 
loyalty is suspect.  
 
Jordanian pluralists actively refer to the law as the basis for Jordanian citizenship, 
regardless of national origin. They hold that one can choose to be a Jordanian without 
ceasing to be Palestinian and that this does not disturb their loyalty to Jordan. 
Jordanians of Palestinian origin are considered to be as Jordanian as the East Bank 
Jordanians. Thus, the pluralists stress a more legalistic definition of citizenship and a 
more hybrid sense of identity than the nationalists  
 
The East Bank nationalists are forced to recognize the Palestinian Jordanians’ right to 
remain in Jordan as a legal reality but at the same time they try to undermine it by 
emphasising the importance of identity and linage. All nationalists naturally support 
the right of return, but while some hold that large groups of Palestinians should be 
forced to return when possible, others hold that only Palestinians who want to return 
should, but that those who choose to remain must become full-fledged Jordanians 
with only one loyalty; that to Jordan. The pluralists support both the right of return 
and the right to remain for all Palestinian Jordanians and at the same time they 
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recognise that since the right of return may not be possible to carry out, the right to 
remain is the right that needs to be protected.  
Conclusion 
 
The debate over whether or not it is possible to be a true Jordanian citizen and at the 
same time have a different national identity shows that the question of who 
legitimately constitutes the Jordanian society is still not answered, and that there is 
still uncertainty over what it means to be Jordanian. Through its balancing act of 
keeping its power base and at the same time trying to integrate the Palestinians into 
the Jordanian society, the state has contributed to this uncertainty.   
 
In order for the state to succeed in its aim of developing a hybrid Jordanian identity 
and integrating the Palestinians deeper into Jordanian society, this situation of 
uncertainty needs to be solved. By applying the pluralists’ idea that there is no 
contradiction in being both a Palestinian and a Jordanian citizen, the Palestinian 
Jordanians would be given an opportunity to become active citizens and to take part 
in the public debate and the development of Jordanian society without having to 
denounce their Palestinian identity and their loyalty to Palestine. On the other hand, 
by not letting go of the Jordanian nationalists’ constant demands for the Palestinians’ 
undivided loyalty to Jordan, the Palestinians’ access to involvement in the Jordanian 
polity might not just be hampered, but also possibly weakened.  
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Chapter 4: The Palestinians in Wihdat camp – between 
exclusion and inclusion  
 
Wihdat camp has a long history of resistance and political activism, and is a strong 
symbol of the Palestinian struggle. Wihdat Club, one of the most famous and 
successful football teams in Jordan, has its origins in the camp, and one can detect a 
distinct pride and local patriotism among its inhabitants. But there is also a wide-
spread concern that the camp is rapidly losing its Palestinian character and becoming 
a normal neighbourhood, indistinguishable from its surroundings. This chapter argues 
that the state has been relatively successful in its recent strategy of physically opening 
up Wihdat camp and integrating it into the city of Amman. But at the same time the 
regime strategy has contributed to strengthening the local patriotism and an ‘us 
against them’-mentality in the camp. The state’s firm control of the camp through the 
use of state institutions and the bureaucracy in combination with the camp dwellers’ 
strong feeling of being discriminated against works together to give them a sense of 
exclusion, a sense of being considered as less Jordanian than other groups. Through-
out this chapter I will use empirical data from my fieldwork to illustrate how the 
recent development influences on everyday life in Wihdat. 
 
Who are the Palestinian refugees? 
 
The Palestinian refugee camps were set up after the two periods of influx of refugees 
in 1948 and 1967. When the refugees first came to Jordan, they settled by their own 
means, in different places and in different ways and were provided for by the ICRC8 
and the American Quakers. UNRWA took over these tasks when it was established in 
1950, and it also started constructing refugee camps. This was desired by the 
Jordanian state, which wanted to gather the refugees who had up till then been 
squatting in different places in distinct, controllable areas. Setting up refugee camps 
would also solve the notable problem of disagreements between landowners and 
refugees over land rights, as the state now bought or leased the land the refugees lived 
                                                
8 International Committee of the Red Cross 
   36 
on from the landowners9. According to Jaber, the construction of the camps was a 
way of preserving social order under the changing demographic circumstances and to 
keep the Palestinian refugees and the Transjordanian population apart (Jaber 2006: 
188). The establishment of the camps made it easier for the authorities to control the 
refugees but at the same time it also made it possible for the refugees to pursue their 
old relationships and values. Thus, the camps became “foci both of oppression and of 
Palestinianism” (Sayigh 2007:112). The core ingredient of Palestinian identity in 
Jordan; the ‘refugee identity’, derived from the refugee camps:  
The typical camp, with its UNRWA-schools and clinics, dirty yards and 
narrow streets, poverty and pride, social networks and political activities, 
local informal economy and international protection, solidarity within and 
xenophobia towards outsiders, strict boundaries and internal freedom, rural 
conservative and urban liberal stances, were symptoms of an unstable but 
deeply-rooted identity (al-Hamarneh 2004: 205). 
Today there are about 1,9 million Palestinian refugees in Jordan, representing 42 % of 
all Palestinian refugees registered with the UNRWA in their five fields of operation10. 
18 % or about 334.000 of the refugees in Jordan live in camps; the rest mainly live in 
cities and towns. Because the UNRWA definition of a Palestinian refugee excludes 
people who ended up outside the agency’s five fields of operation or who were not 
residing in Palestine at the time the 1948 war broke out, the actual number of refugees 
is higher than the official UNRWA numbers. Also, refugees often do not notify the 
UNRWA of changes in family status and many of the refugees’ descendants are not 
registered with the UNRWA.  
 
UNRWA’s operational definition of a Palestine refugee is any person whose "normal 
place of residence was Palestine during the period from 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 
and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict." 
Palestinian refugees are persons who fulfil the above definition and descendants of 
men fulfilling the definition (UNRWA online 2009). 
 
                                                
9 Based on an interview with Matar Saqer, Public Information Officer at the UNRWA Jordan Field 
Office, Amman, November 23, 2009. 
10 Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank including East Jerusalem. 
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“The origin of Amman is Wihdat” – the history of Wihdat camp 
 
Wihdat, officially New Amman Camp, is one of 13 Palestinian refugee camps in 
Jordan. It was established in 1955 on 0,488 square kilometres 3 km north of the centre 
of Amman. In the beginning, 5000 refugees from the villages between Yafa and 
Jerusalem inhabited the camp. Wihdat today has 21 private clinics, seven mosques, a 
post office and a police station. UNRWA is responsible for two health centres and 16 
schools for about 11 000 students. There is also a youth club, a rehabilitation centre 
for the disabled and 14 NGOs running charities, kindergartens, awareness projects 
and vocational training projects (DPA 2008: 33). As the camp today has more than 50 
000 inhabitants11, overcrowding is one of the most serious day-to-day problems. For 
instance, the schools run double shifts to accommodate the large number of students. 
The overcrowding is also evident in the market. There are about 2 500 enterprises in 
the camp making it the main shopping area in East Amman for both clothes, food and 
other commodities, but the infrastructure is not sufficiently developed, and getting 
from one side of the camp to the other can be a serious challenge.   
Camp identity in Wihdat 
Wihdat was one of the main centres in the formation and development of the 
Palestinian national movement in Jordan and it was in the 1960s, 70s and 80s a strong 
symbol for Palestinianism (al-Hamarneh 2002b). Because of its strong position both 
ideologically and as a centre for armed struggle, it was together with al-Husayn camp 
almost razed to the ground by the Jordanian armed forces during the civil war in 
1970-71. The camps were used as training grounds and operational centres and as the 
fiercest resistance was launched from them, casualties there were especially high 
(Bailey 1984: 57, Brand 1988: 171). People in Wihdat are proud of the history of the 
camp and one can still sense the camp identity described by al-Hamarneh above.  
 I feel that Wihdat is Palestine. When I enter the camp I’m met with the smell 
of Palestine. I’m not sure why this is. Maybe it’s the people, or the football 
team. The solidarity. Wihdat is like our homeland (watanna). I like everything 
here.  
-Imm Fuad (49) 
                                                
11 No exact numbers exist, but most estimates are around this number. 
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Imm Fuad links her patriotic feelings for Wihdat directly to Palestine. For the younger 
generation however, the patriotism is linked to the camp itself, it is not connected to 
Palestine: 
Wihdat is different from the other camps. It has everything. We have more 
education. In my family, for instance, we all have higher education. Wihdat is 
my identity, my childhood. My best memories stem from Wihdat. I love the 
people here, and I feel more at home here than I do in Dahiyye [where I live 
now]. People in Wihdat are united, but people who come from other places 
destroy the unity, they are not like us.  
                                -Rim (26) 
Like al-Hamarneh points out and the quote above shows, there is a strong ‘us against 
them’-mentality in the camp. However, when I ask Amine how Wihdat compares to 
other camps, she answers I don’t know. Why would we go there? Although she feels 
strongly about Wihdat, she does not consider other camp dwellers to be closer to her 
than other Jordanians. Thus, the distinction is not between an ‘us’ that comprises all 
Palestinian camp dwellers and a ‘them’ that comprises all other Jordanians. It is the 
Palestinian inhabitants of Wihdat camp against the rest. This does not mean that the 
people in Wihdat feel that they are not a part of Amman. For Samah, Wihdat is the 
true Amman, and the people of Wihdat are its ‘true’ citizens:    
Life in Wihdat is good, people have solidarity, we are all the same. We go to 
the same schools, dress more or less the same. Wihdat is like a separate eco 
system, a separate culture. You can trust people here, because you know who 
they are. Here we drink coffee, in the West side they drink cappuccino, latte, 
all sorts of things. Here we eat bread; there they have lots of fancy names for 
it. When you think about it, everyone in Amman originate from the camps, but 
people have moved out and become different. The origin of Amman is Wihdat.  
                        -Samah (33) 
Although the inhabitants of Wihdat are proud of the camp and carry a distinct camp 
identity, the content of this identity has changed. While for the older generation the 
pride of and identity with Wihdat is linked to Palestine, the youngest generation feel 
proud of and identify with it because it is their home. Thus, a specifically local patrio-
tism has developed at the same time as the Jordanian state has implemented a strategy 
of opening up and enhancing greater integration of the refugee camps into Jordanian 
society.  
State intervention in Wihdat after the Civil War 
After the Civil War and the crushing of the Palestinian national movement in 1970-
71, the first wide streets were built across Wihdat. This was done mainly for security 
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purposes12, but also as part of a government strategy to integrate the camps of the 
Greater Amman district into the metropolis of Amman and at the same time promote 
greater integration of the Palestinians into the Jordanian society. Later, electricity, 
telephone and wastewater lines were installed. In the early 1980s permanent cement 
roofs were built and limited permissions to build second floors were given (al-
Hamarneh 2002b, 2004: 209). Today Wihdat looks more like a working class neigh-
bourhood in East Amman than a refugee camp. The borders between the camp and the 
surrounding areas are blurred, there are no gates and no special permits are required to 
enter. It is no longer a purely Palestinian area, as fifteen to seventeen percent of the 
inhabitants are Egyptian, Iraqi, Gypsy and other minorities (al-Hamarneh 2004: 216). 
The only official sign that it is a refugee camp is the UN flags swaying from the 
UNRWA schools and social centres, and a trained eye will notice the layout of the 
buildings and the pattern of straight alleys typical for the refugee camps in Jordan.  
 
The informants all agree that Wihdat has changed fundamentally since the Civil War. 
Improvements in education, health and infrastructure are greatly appreciated but the 
price to pay for this development is a loss of Palestinian character in the camp and a 
feeling of political acquiescence. The informants blame increasing drug use, gang 
violence harassment of girls and other unwanted behaviour on what they see as a 
weakening of the solidarity between the Palestinians, reinforced by the influx of new, 
non-Palestinian inhabitants. Samah connects the state’s opening up of the camps 
directly to the Arab countries’ need for stability in the region: 
The state opened up Wihdat, it is part of the city, not a closed unit like before. 
None of the countries around Palestine wants it to be a state; they fear it, 
because then the whole situation will change. They can talk about Palestine 
and the Palestinians, but they cannot take action. We can’t talk about this, 
one has to be careful and keep things to oneself. Even though you can read 
about this in books, you cannot talk. It is safer to keep quiet.  
                       -Samah (33)
  
Budur and Rim feel that the change in the composition of inhabitants due to an influx 
of poor people who are not Palestinians, and the explosive development of Wihdat as 
                                                
12 Before this there were only narrow alleys, making it hard for the armed forces to enter and control 
the camp. 
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a main commercial area in East Amman is destroying the Palestinian character of the 
camp and that it is quickly changing into a ‘normal’ neighbourhood: 
Wihdat resembles a town, not a camp. It doesn’t feel like a camp, especially 
because of all the people from other places. […] People move out because 
the units are too small, they need more space. It is not allowed to build more 
than two floors, so it is hard to expand. I hope people will return, but I’m 
afraid Wihdat is changing into an ordinary neighbourhood. It’s a pity really. 
But we will remain Wihdatis till we die!  
-Rim (26) 
In the future, the camp will turn into a market; it will no longer be a 
residential area. It will be like Souq al-Hamidiyye or Khan al-Khalili13. But 
the camps will remain causes even if the people disappear. Their names will 
remain as symbols. And anyway, there are many camps in Jordan so the 
phenomenon won’t disappear.  
        -Budur (46) 
It seems that the state has been successful in its strategy of integrating Wihdat into 
Amman and decreasing the camp’s role as producer of Palestinian identity in Jordan. 
However, as the next section will show, at the same time as they opened up the 
camps, the state by different means also increased its control over the camp residents. 
This in combination with a general use of the bureaucracy to control the Jordanian 
population and the camp dwellers’ strong feeling of being discriminated against 
works together to limit the integration of the Palestinians into Jordanian society. 
The matrix of control in the camps  
 
[The State] are more in control now than they used to be, they want to know 
everything that is going on. For example, some time ago two people like you, 
who wanted to learn about life in the camp, came to my house. Two men from 
the secret police accompanied them. Of course I didn’t talk to them about the 
things we are talking about now. They didn’t do anything wrong, and they 
didn’t take notes, but I didn’t want to talk about things like these in front of 
them. The reason they are two is to control each other, to make sure we won’t 
be left alone to speak freely. They don’t want old wounds to be opened. […] 
They [the state security apparatus] aren’t like they were before; they don’t 
kill. They have become calmer due to international attention from for 
instance the Red Cross, and because of the focus on human rights. They are 
being watched.  
          - Imm Anwar (62) 
While the Jordanian government took control over the refugee camps by use of the 
armed forces in 1970, they now mainly control the camps through different govern-
                                                
13 The most important traditional markets in Damascus and Cairo, respectively. 
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mental institutions. The Secret Service, the Civil Defense, the police and the Depart-
ment of Palestinian Affairs (DPA) have permanent presence in the camps (Farah 
1999: 150). The DPA is the Jordanian government’s executive arm in dealing with the 
Palestinian refugee camps and is linked to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The DPA 
is responsible for providing infrastructure and for facilitating services provided by 
other institutions like the UNRWA and governmental institutions and ministries. The 
stated aim of the DPA is to work “hand in hand with other governmental institutions, 
UNRWA, NGOs and the donating countries, to establish productive projects that lift 
economic normality if refugees and training programs for the provision of the 
necessary and proper skills for the labour market (DPA 2008: 11). But the DPA also 
has a controlling function. Although the DPA is only directly present in five camps a 
Camp Service Committee (CSC), called al-lajne by camp inhabitants, is present in all 
the camps. The members of the CSCs are all residents of the camps and they are 
chosen by the DPA, which also funds the CSCs. The members are usually men of 
influence and status in the camp, a status equivalent to village heads, or are important 
members of a particular clan (Farah 1999: 150). In order to obtain a permit to open a 
business, a certificate of residence that makes it possible to apply for higher education 
or other important official documents, one has to go to the CSC. According to one 
informant this is a means for the state to control the camp inhabitants:  
I have had problems because I am politically active on behalf of Palestine. 
For example, a friend and I were planning to open a café. We did everything 
right, followed the rules, filled in the papers and invested a lot in getting it 
ready. But at the very last minute, we didn’t get the opening permit from the 
DPA. This is because of my dealings with politics; this is one way the State 
controls us.  
- Wael (28) 
People do not distinguish between the DPA and the CSC when they talk about them, 
they are both called al-lajne, and they are both considered to be tools of the state. A 
staff member of an UNRWA office outside the camps told me that people in the 
camps hate the DPA and the CSC because they are considered to be representatives of 
the secret police, and people believe that they work for the state and not for the 
people. Like Wael, she also claimed that permits could be denied if one is too political 
or in other ways a problem, and that nothing can be done without a permit. Budur also 
agrees to this: 
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I used to think that the DPA was created for our benefit, but it isn’t. It is 
created for the state, and they decide everything. I didn’t know, but they 
decide everything here [in the camp]. The people who work there are em-
ployed by the state. All the employees used to be Palestinians, but now it is 
mixed. Ibrahim [the head of the DPA in Wihdat] is Jordanian, of Jordanian 
descent. This has never happened before. 
-Budur (46) 
 
Farah mentions that in Baqa’ camp, where she did her fieldwork, many believe that 
the CSC have made profit out of the services they offer, mainly the pavement of 
alleyways, as the amount they collected from inhabitants exceeded the costs incurred. 
Residents also point out that they had offered their free labour on many of the 
projects, including the paving of roads (Farah 1999: 151).  
 
In the past, UNRWA employees would distribute food, assist in helping individual 
families fix or renovate their shelter and intervene in some of the conflicts that 
emerged in the camps. Today, due to economical cutbacks, the agency’s contribution 
is more abstract and expresses itself mainly through its educational programs, as well 
as programs directed to enable refugees to become 'self-reliant' such as 'income-
generation projects'. A consequence of this is that the role of the DPA has become 
more important and more visible in the camps, as they have slowly taken over some 
of the functions previously carried out by UNRWA (Farah 1999: 150).  
 
According to Matar Saqer14 the division of power and responsibility between the state 
and the UNRWA is not always clear: 
When it comes to the women’s centres, we are not in charge, but we keep an 
eye on them. Earlier they were financed by the UNRWA, and the directors of 
the UNRWA in the camps were also directors of the women’s centres. From 
the mid 1990s their own revenues finance the centres, and the CSC 
administers them. Yet, they are using our premises and we among other 
things contribute with legal advice services. We created them, but they want 
to be independent. It is true that there is a vacuum here. 
  
This situation opens up to a power struggle between the UNRWA, the different state 
institutions and high-ranking representatives from the camps. During a visit to one of 
the camps outside Amman I got a taste of this struggle. 
                                                
14 Public Information Officer at the UNRWA Jordan Field Office 
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Playing the power game – the incident of the lost glasses  
Today we went to the CSC to get research permission for my friend. Since they didn’t 
know what to do, they called the mukhtar15, who is a family acquaintance of my 
friend. He invited us to his house for coffee and then took us to the police, where my 
friend, like me, was appointed a police guardian while she was in the camp. We then 
went with the mukhtar to some of the institutions in the camp to make appointments 
for interviews. At one point I discovered that I had forgotten my glasses somewhere 
and after checking with the mukhtar’s wife, we called the police to ask if I had 
forgotten them there. They found nothing. On our way back to the bus I suggested we 
pass by the police station again to ask if they had found the glasses, and the mukhtar 
agreed. I was very surprised when the chef of police exploded in anger, screaming 
that we didn’t trust him and that we accused him of being a thief. I tried to take the 
blame for this faux pas, being a foreigner, but he did not listen, as all his anger was 
directed at the mukhtar. After about 15 minutes my friend managed to calm him 
down, after he had tried to throw us out of the police station several times, screaming 
to the mukhtar that he ‘would pay for this’.  
          From my field diary 
 
On our way home we tried to understand what had happened. How could the chief of 
police become this agitated because a foreigner had overstepped a social convention? 
We came to the conclusion that this was probably a show put on to make sure we 
understood who was in charge of the camp and to put the mukhtar in his place. We 
had learned that you do not challenge the power of the state without getting in trouble, 
whether you are a foreign student or a mukhtar.  
Embedded authoritarianism 
In connection with increasing popular unrest due to economic problems in the late 
1980s, Jordan in 1989 started a process of political liberalisation. Parliamentary 
elections were held for the first time since electoral activities were banned and martial 
law was imposed in 1957, greater civil society activism was permitted and in 1992 
political parties were allowed. This process led to a change in the methods the regime 
                                                
15 Traditionally a village headman, a position first established by Ottoman authorities as their 
administrative representative in the villages. In the Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan it is used more 
loosely as a term for important leaders in the camp. 
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was using to keep control of the population. With its new democratic rhetoric, the 
state could no longer afford straight-out repression. Thus, rather than the brutal forms 
of physical force used during the martial law period, the state now resorted to what 
Wiktorowicz calls ‘embedded authoritarianism’, which he defines as “social control 
projected through a complex array of administrative procedures, legal codes and 
informal regulative practices designed to constrain opposition without resorting to 
violence. […] [P]ower and control are embedded in bureaucratic processes, masked 
beneath the veneer of visible democratic institutions and practices” (Wiktorowicz 
2002: 111). However, although the primary agent of control is now the bureaucracy 
and not the secret police, the military or totalitarian instruments, the secret police still 
play an important role, as it checks and controls people, organizations and institutions 
before eventual permits and positions are approved by the bureaucracy. In this way 
the regime can claim to be democratic at the same time as they control and repress the 
citizens through the bureaucracy (Wiktorowicz 2002: 121f). This does not mean that 
torture and violence is no longer used by the Jordanian regime, but that this more 
often than before occurs in instances where embedded authoritarianism fails, and not 
as a first remedy (Wiktorowicz 2002: 124n6).   
Discrimination – that we are all Jordanians is only true on the posters  
Citizenship can be characterised as both a status and a set of rights. Since a cardinal 
value of citizenship is equality, individuals who do not have the same political, 
economical or social rights as other citizen can claim to be discriminated against 
based on this unequal distribution of rights (Nanes 2003: 10).  
 
With the redefinition of the Palestinians as the ‘other’ after the Civil War in 1970-71, 
the Palestinian-dominated merchant class lost much of its political power to the 
Jordanian-based bureaucracy. Discriminatory politics against Palestinians became 
increasingly institutionalised; there was less employment in the public sector and 
fewer academic opportunities available for them. An unofficial quota system for 
employing Jordanian academics that started in the 1970s and became intensified after 
1989 resulted in emptying Jordan’s state universities of Palestinian academics, as few 
new positions have been given to Palestinians  (Massad 2001: 13f, 258). 
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Citizens of Palestinian origin have also been discriminated against through electoral 
laws. IN 2008, only seven out of 55 senators16 were of Palestinian origin and the 
election laws are designed to over-represent segments of the population allied with 
the regime (Choucair-Vizoso 2008: 49). 
 
However, when discussing discrimination in the formal political system it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that although Palestinian Jordanians suffer a particular exclusion 
from politics, the entire public sphere is limited by the overarching authoritarianism 
of the regime, prohibiting the majority of all Jordanians from an active role in gover-
nance (Nanes 2003: 10).  
 
For the informants, discrimination in the labour market and in public administration is 
a more urgent problem than discrimination in the political system, because it keeps 
them from climbing the social ladder and reaching their goals. 
It is impossible for us to get jobs in the security system. My brother is an 
officer in the army, but only because he was supported by a Jordanian with 
connections. He had wasta17. According to the law, we are all equal, but in 
reality we are not. There is a difference between private and public sector, 
and in public sector there is a limit to how far we can get.  
-Luay (53) 
Budur agrees, but believes that because the Palestinians are in majority, the state also 
controls them for strategic reasons: 
There is not equality between the Jordanians and us. We are constantly asked 
where we are from, and there is a glass ceiling that stops us from climbing 
too high in the system. That we are all Jordanians is only true on the posters. 
They know we are more numerous than they admit. They used to put the 
letters J (Jordanian) and B (Palestinian) in our passports, but not anymore. 
But they can tell by your name anyway.      
-Budur (46) 
Not everyone agrees that differences between Jordanians and Palestinians are a result 
of state discrimination. Maisam links discrimination to poverty and considers the 
differences between Jordanians and Palestinians as a natural result of the Palestinians 
being latecomers:  
                                                
16 Members of the Jordanian Senate are appointed directly by the king. 
17 Connections 
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Yes, there are many poor people here, but not just Palestinians. You can’t 
blame poverty on discrimination. I feel that people who complain about 
discrimination are exaggerating. […] The Palestinians came here with 
nothing; they had to build everything from scratch. The Jordanians who were 
already here had houses and land. This is the reason why there is a difference 
between us. It is natural. Maybe the Jordanians have an advantage from 
better wasta, but still.  
-Maisam (41) 
Shuruq thinks there is no difference between the two groups, but admits that her 
opinion might change if she travelled more outside of the camp: 
There is no difference between Jordanians and Palestinians; we are the same. 
Or, maybe I would have noticed that there is a difference if I for instance 
went to Mafraq. I don’t know. Here there are mainly Palestinians, so I don’t 
feel there is a difference.   
-Shuruq (32) 
Imm Anwar has a different view on discrimination. She acknowledges that it exists, 
but she does not consider it to be a problem:  
We raise [our children] to know where they are from. Even the Jordanian 
authorities do that. By asking people where they are originally from, they 
remind people that they are Palestinian, even if that is not their purpose. 
They are helping us more than we are helping ourselves. Our daughters, who 
have all attended state schools, were asked all the time if they were refugees 
from the 48 or the 67 war. It helps us to remember who we are. 
- Imm Anwar (62) 
The youngest girls have the strongest sense of local patriotism and at the same time 
feel they are looked upon with suspicion by out of camp-Jordanians: 
People from outside dislike people from Wihdat. My cousin for instance does 
not want a girl from the camp. I don’t know why. People say we are difficult, 
strong. There isn’t much difference between Wihdat and the surrounding 
areas really, but people are prejudiced. The real difference is between us and 
the rich people [the people in West Amman]. […] Maybe people dislike that 
people are so close to each other here, that everyone knows everyone. Maybe 
they are afraid of us.  
-Amina (26) 
We don’t know why people think about us like that. Go to Shmisani and ask. 
The boys fight a lot here; there are lots of big fights. Maybe this happens 
because there are such close ties between people. The older generations 
didn’t want brides and grooms from the camps, but it is easier now, there is 
more interaction. Maybe people are afraid to mix with us because of all the 
fighting, that they are afraid to get involved. 
-Ahlam (28) 
The informants feel that discrimination keeps them from achieving many of their 
personal goals. At the same time it is a recurring reminder of their Palestinianness and 
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as Imm Anwar points out it in this way helps strengthening or at least maintaining the 
Palestinian identity of the Palestinian citizens of Jordan.  
Conclusion 
 
The informants have complicated feelings toward Wihdat. They are proud of 
belonging to it and display a strong local patriotism, especially the younger 
generation. At the same time, they have conflicting feelings toward the rapid changes 
that have happened as a result of the state’s intervention into both Wihdat and other 
camps in Amman. As the camps have been integrated into the rest of Amman these 
changes have brought new possibilities for work and economic development. But they 
have also contributed to an increasing de-Palestinisation of the camps, something that 
in the long run might undermine their symbolic importance as strongholds of 
Palestinianness and keepers of collective memory. 
 
The discrimination and suspicion the camp Palestinians feel they are met with might 
contribute to slowing down the process of de-Palestinisation of the camps, as it 
contributes to an ‘us and them’-mentality that enhances the local patriotism and 
feeling of belonging. Other factors that also contribute to this are the security 
apparatus’ control of the camp, the embedded authoritarianism that characterises the 
whole society and the discrimination of Palestinians in the political system.  
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Chapter 5: Citizenship and the right of return 
 
The power of citizenship is probably best know to those who are denied it: 
the right to carry a passport and be protected by a state; the right to abode; the 
right to membership in a political community with access to decision-making 
institutions and public welfare. Citizenship is a scarce public good that is 
distributed by the state, a source of collective identity and an instrument of 
political control. […] It is the right to have rights (Butenschon et al. 2000: 5). 
 
Over 1,9 million Palestinian refugees, 42 % of the grand total of Palestinian refugees 
registered with the UNRWA reside in Jordan. Yet, the fact that most of these have 
Jordanian citizenship is treated like a detail in both the Palestinian and the academic 
hegemonic narratives of ‘the Palestinian refugee’. While there is a wide selection of 
literature that deals with the Right of Return and the legal status of the Palestinian 
refugees in general, there is limited qualitative research available on the Palestinian 
camp refugees in Jordan, and little of this research deals with citizenship.  
 
After a brief clarification on what I mean by ‘generation’ I will present what I 
conceive to be the hegemonic discourses of ‘the Palestinian refugee’ and how these 
discourses have dealt with Palestinian refugees who hold Jordanian citizenship. My 
claim is that their citizenship has mostly been ignored. The second part of the chapter 
discusses what effects Jordanian citizenship has had on the identities of the 
Palestinian refugees in Jordan and to what degree this has made them different from 
the dominating image of ‘the Palestinian refugee’. For this purpose I will use empiri-
cal data from my fieldwork in Wihdat camp.  
 
The third and final part of the chapter discusses the limits of Jordanian citizenship. 
The purpose of this part is to assess to what degree the Palestinian refugees with 
Jordanian citizenship can trust that their citizenship and rights will not be taken away 
from them at some point in the future. A lack of trust in the stability of their 
citizenship might contribute to slowing down the development of a hybrid 
Palestinian-Jordanian identity, something that would give the Palestinian Jordanians 
less incentive to take part in and influence the development of Jordan.  
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A short note on generations 
 
Abdallah divides the Palestinian refugees into four generations and defines 
generations as “groups of persons who have lived through the same historical periods 
and political and economic situations at the same point in their life cycle” (Abdallah 
2009: 48). These four generations are the old generation/the generation of Palestine, 
born in or before 1938, Banaat al-nakba18, born between 1939 and 1953, the Saudi 
generation, born between 1954 and 1968 and the television or satellite generation, 
born between 1969 and 1983. In this study this division is not used in a strict sense. 
Rather, I have merged Abdallah’s old generation and nakba-generation into one 
generation called the oldest generation and the Saudi generation and the television 
generation into one called the middle generation. In addition to these two, I have 
added a third generation born after 1983 that I call the youngest generation. In this 
way I am left with three generations with different approaches to being Palestinian, 
Jordanian citizen and a refugee. Of course, not all informants fit into ‘their’ gene-
ration. This has to do with among other things class, education, political orientation 
and personal life experience.  
 
Who is the Palestinian refugee? – the hegemonic discourses 
 
Even though a Palestinian national identity was emerging in the early 1900s in 
connection with the collapse of the Ottoman empire and the following colonisation of 
the Middle East, the war in 1948 and the following expulsion and dispersal of the 
Palestinians from their homeland has been the most important event in shaping a 
modern Palestinian national identity, both in Palestine and in exile (Khalidi 2010). 
The experiences of exile; fragmentation, loss of homeland and denial of return has 
shaped an identity of ‘suffering’, and it was in exile that the resistance was later 
formulated, that the ideology of ‘armed struggle’ and ‘revolution’ was asserted as a 
strategy to overcome processes of victimisation and to transcend the state of 
dispossession, denial and statelessness. The dispersal and fragmentation thus served 
as uniting factors in the development of the modern Palestinian national identity, 
                                                
18 Daughters of the catastrophe 
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making the absence of territory a weighty component in creations and recreations of 
ethnic and national identities in exile (Schulz 2003: 2). Return has become a focal 
point of identity and politics, described by Schulz as a “mantra in PLO discourse,”   
a doxa of Palestinian discourse, a hegemonic principle to which there has 
been very little, if any, counter-argument. […] [B]ereavement of both land 
and time suggests a loss of orientation in life, and therefore of meaning. Only 
a return can change present turmoil and non-existence. In a liminal condition, 
it is only the constant wish and hope of returning which is meaningful. Return 
implies harmony after turmoil, coming home after time in the wilderness. 
[…] As time has passed and as exile has proved enduring, however, the hope 
and the dream have been transferred to the younger generation. Ceremonies 
have been held to hand over keys to the children. As the first generation came 
to realize that maybe they were not going back after all, then it was the 
children who would come home: ‘If we can’t go, then maybe our children 
will.’ […] Return has, however, become increasingly abstract, and has been 
placed in a distant, undefined tomorrow. It would and must happen, but when, 
no one could know (Schulz 2003: 205ff). 
The very different experiences of the generation that was forced to leave everything 
behind and spend their lives grieving, and the next generation that grew up in exile, 
looking for identity in active struggle have been  
moulded into a nationalist discourse effectively defining the ‘Palestinian self’. 
Both the suffering and the unbending struggle have clustered around the 
camp as a focal point: ‘Clearly suffering and resistance are conflated with an 
assumed purity of identity that inheres in life in the camps’. Camp 
Palestinians have thus been portrayed as the real Palestinians; they were both 
the real victims of the nakba and the real actors of nidal – the struggle. Also, 
they are the ones to return (Schulz 2003: 124). 
Thus, in the Palestinian hegemonic discourse, the ‘real’ Palestinian refugee is a 
suffering and struggling camp dweller whose main purpose is return to Palestine. The 
Jordanian Palestinians’ citizenship has no place in this narrative.  
 
When it comes to the academic empirical research on camp refugees, most of it has 
been done in Lebanon (Sayigh 1979, 1994, Peteet 1991 etc.), where the mainly 
stateless Palestinians live under very poor conditions and with an uncertain future. In 
a situation where they have limited access to work, public services and other basic 
commodities and have been legally considered to be foreigners for the last sixty years, 
it is safe to say that they fit the description of the ‘Palestinian refugee’ well.  
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When Sayigh and Abu-Lughod write about the Palestinians who live in refugee 
camps in Jordan, they downplay the importance of citizenship and emphasise their 
status as refugees. Sayigh shows how the majority of in and out of camp-refugees 
subsist at the lowest economical level in Jordan, as well as in the other major refugee 
areas (Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza). However, she holds that  
[w]hat creates a political refugee identity is […] not just poverty, which the 
refugees share with many of the surrounding populations, but a mix of low 
status, limited opportunity, vulnerability and thwarted national identity. Even 
when Palestinians have adopted the nationality of a host country, theirs is a 
lesser citizenship (Sayigh 1998: 20).  
She does not explain in what way their citizenship is ‘lesser’, and she gives 
citizenship little if any importance in the formation of the identity of the Palestinians 
living in refugee camps in Jordan. 
 
Abu-Lughod also downplays the importance of the citizenship of the camp dwellers 
in Jordan:  
In Jordan, Palestinians have perhaps achieved the greatest degree of ‘home’ 
in exile. […] However, despite this, Palestinians retain a poignant sense of 
exile, the political expression of which has been severely repressed (Abu-
Lughod 1988: 66). 
She does not give citizenship any weight when she goes on to generalize about the 
camp refugees, claiming that the refugees need to return to Palestine in order to 
become healed as a people. They carry with them an ‘unhealable rift in their souls’ 
that can only be healed through the exiles being given the option of return. Through 
this option,  
Palestinians who, in the past forty years, have not only guarded their status as 
exiles but have passed it on to their children, leaving the entire community in 
a psychological limbo which prevents its members from moving in any viable 
direction, might once again be regarded as refugees rather than exiles (Abu-
Lughod 1988: 68).  
In this way, both Sayigh and Abu-Lughod connect a ‘poignant sense of exile’, a ‘psy-
chological limbo’ and the impossibility of ‘moving in any viable direction’ to refu-
geeness, and not to statelessness, as Takkenberg suggests may be a more important 
factor: 
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The fact that most of the Palestinians who were displaced as a result of the 
1948 war are at the same time both refugees and stateless persons prompt the 
question as to which of these two manifestations of ‘unprotectedness’ has had 
the more significant impact on the individuals concerned. It is obvious that 
initially the refugee dimension was of overriding importance, as from one day 
to the other the refugees had lost the means to sustain themselves, dis-
possessed from their homes, land and other belongings. Gradually, the legal 
and political impairment of being stateless, not belonging to a state, not hav-
ing a national passport, became more significant. As being stateless has also 
equally affected many Palestinians who are not refugees, it may even be argu-
ed that this element has been more dominant than the refugee aspect in nega-
tively affecting the life of individual Palestinians (Takkenberg 1998: 347f). 
To sum up; in both hegemonic discourses the Palestinian refugee is stateless, in limbo 
and needs the option of return in order to heal.  
 
There is no reason to doubt the validity of this assessment when it comes to the 
Lebanese camp refugees. But are the Jordanian Palestinians who are not stateless in a 
limbo, and do they need the option of return to heal? I do not claim that these 
researchers are wrong. What I wish to point out that because of their Jordanian 
citizenship, the Palestinian refugees in Jordan to a lesser degree fit in to this 
description and that this has been understated. As I have shown, the return to 
Palestine is a core component in the hegemonic discourse of the Palestinian refugee. 
In the following section I will have a look at how the informants view both an 
eventual future return to Palestine and the juridical Right of Return and how these 
views connect to their Jordanian citizenship.  
The effects of Jordanian citizenship – changing identities and 
changing views on return. 
 
The one thing that is absolutely undisputed among the informants is that all Pale-
stinian refugees have the right to return and that this right cannot be waived or negoti-
ated away. Only the refugees themselves can make the choice between staying in 
Jordan and moving to Palestine. Thus, when it comes to the juridical Right of Return, 
the Palestinians in Jordan are to a certain degree in agreement with the Palestinian and 
academic hegemonic discourses. However, this does not necessarily mean that all the 
informants want to return or that they consider themselves bereaved of meaning and 
in a limbo where only return is meaningful. In the following section I will present 
findings from Wihdat camp that show clear differences between the oldest generation 
and the two younger when it comes to return, citizenship and identity. While the 
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oldest generation live in a state of temporariness or limbo, the middle generation hold 
a more ambivalent position and the youngest generation clearly challenges the doxa 
of return.  
Palestine is my country; Jordan is a place I live. The oldest generation – Imm 
Khalid, Shirin, Imm Anwar 
The oldest informants, who either remember the nakba or grew up in the 1950s and 
remember the turmoil of the first years well, have identities that are very much in 
accordance with ‘the Palestinian refugee’. I will give a short insight into their stories 
of expulsion and have a look at how their views and opinions fit the description of 
‘the Palestinian refugee’.  
 
Shirin grew up in Palestine, and remembers both her homeland and the nakba well:  
We are from Majdal and Ras al-Ein, Kufr Kasem. […] I remember 1948 like 
it was yesterday. Guns, tanks, planes. We escaped on donkeys; there weren’t 
cars like there is today. The bullets swirled around us and I escaped death 
several times. In Majdal we escaped into the mountains. A boy who was 
around 12 years old came riding on a horse, he fell off but he didn’t die, and 
he told his father, who was picking fruit, that they [the Jews] were coming. 
His father came running and shouted ‘run!’ We didn’t have weapons. It was 
an expulsion/deportation (taghriibe). […] We went from place to place 
because we didn’t feel safe anywhere. We didn’t have land, and there were no 
jobs. That’s why we ended up in Amman; it held possibilities. We believed we 
would be able to go back within a few months. We thought the fedayeen 
would be able to fight them. We didn’t think the Jews wanted our land, we 
thought they wanted our belongings. But God decides. Everyone in Palestine 
had their own vegetable garden, they grew what they needed, were 
independent. We had land. Here there is no land, we can not manage on our 
own. […] I still have hope that all Palestinians can return to Palestine. But 
my life is as it is. God decides. 
-Shirin (appr. 80) 
Shirin is a typical representative of the oldest generation. She defines herself as a 
refugee and believes that a return to Palestine is her individual right as well as the 
right of every Palestinian refugee. For this generation, Palestine is a physical place 
and their only real home. Return to Palestine is an, if not realistic, then at least ideal 
option for the future, both for themselves and for their descendents, who they consider 
to be refugees.  
 
Imm Khalid is in her 70s. Her husband died 19 years into their marriage and from 
then on she took care of herself and her ten children by running a small grocery shop 
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she and her husband owned. She is very proud of her children. Most of them have 
higher education and all but two sons are married. Imm Khalid looks back on her life 
in Wihdat: 
I have no good memories from Wihdat. People here are good; even if we are 
from all over [Palestine] we are one family. That is the best thing about 
Wihdat. I haven’t seen much good here, we had to leave our fields and 
orchards behind. My wish is to die in Palestine. I have a three years old 
grandson who says: I’m a tiger. I’m going to bite the Jews. [She shows me 
some soil she brought back from al-Aqsa when she went to visit in 2000] The 
Jews are digging under al-Aqsa, but there will come a day… […] I pray to 
God that we will go back one day; children, grandchildren; everyone.  
-Imm Khalid (74) 
 
Even though she has done comparatively well and her children have been very suc-
cessful, Imm Khalid says she has ‘no good memories from Wihdat’. The only positive 
thing she can think of is the people, the Palestinians in it. It is the link to Palestine that 
makes it a good place, nothing else.  
 
Even though they both are full citizens of Jordan, neither Shirin nor Imm Khalid feels 
any belonging to it. They are Palestinian nationals, waiting in Jordan for the chance to 
go back home. For the oldest generation, Jordan is a waiting place, a limbo where 
they wait for the Right of Return to be implemented and they or their descendants can 
go home to Palestine. 
 
When I ask her if she has Jordanian citizenship, Shirin answers that she has citizen-
ship, family book (dafter al-eele) and UNRWA rationing card (kart ma’an). She men-
tions the family book because this is a proof that she is a full citizen with a national 
ID number. But at the same time, by mentioning the UNRWA rationing card she says 
that the fact that she has Jordanian citizenship doesn’t make her Jordanian; she is a 
Palestinian refugee.  
 
Imm Anwar has been politically active in the Palestinian resistance since she was 14, 
in the early 1960s. She is illiterate but this has never stopped her from taking part in 
politics and she holds a strong position among the followers of her party in Wihdat. 
She calls all the inhabitants in the camp ‘her children’. Like Imm Khalid and Shirin 
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she hopes and believes that all Palestinian refugees will be able to return sometime in 
the future: 
We live in Jordan, that is true, but it is not as if they gave us citizenship out of 
goodness. We are more useful for them than they are for us. We are the oil of 
Jordan. We don’t want their passports; they can take them back. Palestine is 
my country; Jordan is a place I live. I am against the idea that Jordan is the 
second homeland of the Palestinians. Jordan is for the Jordanians, Lebanon 
for the Lebanese, Syria for the Syrians, and Palestine for the Palestinians. 
[…] Here in Jordan we are fine, we have everything we need, but we don’t 
have what we want; our homeland.  
-Imm Anwar (62) 
Imm Anwar is aware of how Jordanian citizenship can lead to a feeling of belonging 
to Jordan and she thinks it was wrong to grant the Palestinian refugees in Jordan 
citizenship. This also becomes clear when she talks about the Jordanian security 
apparatus and their control over the camps: we are guests here; they want to keep 
control over their state. This is understandable.  
 
At the same time, even if she is reluctant to admit it, she is aware that the attitudes to 
return are changing:  
The new generation is thinking more like this [Jordan for the Jordanians, 
Palestine for the Palestinians] than we do. Or, I don’t want to lie. Even if 
they think 50 % like me, it is good. But I think the real figure is 90 %. 
-Imm Anwar 
None of the representatives of the oldest generation express a sense of belonging to 
Jordan; they are Palestinian and they believe in and hope for a physical return to 
Palestine for all refugees and their descendents. Because they have no land, they see 
the Palestinians in the camps as dependent, as opposed to in Palestine before 1948, 
where they were free and independent. While Imm Khalid and Shirin put their hopes 
in God, Imm Anwar believes political or armed struggle will bring a solution: 
These days our political work is mainly about talking, like we are doing here 
now. We cannot do much more than keeping the awareness alive. We are 
doing this while we are waiting for the power balance in Jordan to change. 
Remember the French and the German revolution. Remember the Vietnam 
War. Algeria, Libya. They all won in the end, and so will we. Even if it takes a 
thousand years, justice will come.  
-Imm Anwar 
Farah points out that 
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the historical and political messages in the narratives [of people who 
remember the exodus] reveal an attempt to delineate a 'Palestinian culture' 
and Palestinian ways as different from 'Jordanians.' Taking into consideration 
the common denominators of language, religion and historical relations, such 
a reproduction of difference between Palestinians and Jordanians by necessity 
involves the appropriation of nationalist discourses. For Palestinians, Exile 
and Return necessitate the invocation of being the 'other' in Jordan, and 
Return refers to territory other than the Jordanian boundaries. Consequently, 
keeping Exile and Return as part of popular culture and oral tradition is a way 
that renders the Jordanian citizenship irrelevant to the formation of national 
identities (Farah 2003: 231f). 
This fits well with how the women of the oldest generation present their identities. An 
interesting point is how this nationalist discourse or ‘Palestinian regionalism’ (al-
Hamarneh 2004: 217) can be read as a mirror image of the Jordan for Jordanians-
nationalism that has been voiced in the citizen and identity-discourse. Imm Anwar is 
using the same arguments as the Jordanian nationalists but with a different aim; while 
the Jordanian nationalists want to keep Jordan for the East Jordanians by excluding 
Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin from the Jordanian polity, Imm Anwars aim is 
to stop the erosion of the Palestinian national identity among the Palestinians in 
Jordan. For the younger generations however, the picture is more complicated. This is 
evident in the middle generation, meaning people who are born in Jordan after the 
first period of turmoil, about 1960, and up to about 1980.   
Complex and contradicting identities. The middle generation – Maisam, Budur, 
Reem 
The middle generation has more complex identities of belonging than both the older 
and the younger generation. They have a variety of ways of dealing with the contra-
diction of being both Palestinian refugees in Jordan and Jordanian citizens, something 
that becomes evident in this section. I ask Maisam how she imagines Palestine:  
Even if I’ve never been to Palestine, it’s my homeland (watani). Jordan is my 
country (baladi). I imagine Palestine as a paradise on earth, a beautiful land. 
-Maisam (41) 
Later I ask her what she considers to be her main identity. To my surprise she answers 
I am Jordanian first, then Palestinian. I am a Jordanian citizen, and I enjoy 
full rights. Jordan is the best country in the Middle East. […] A Jordanian is 
someone who is born in Jordan and who holds Jordanian citizenship. […] We 
are not refugees, why would we call ourselves that? We have the same rights, 
we are citizens. 
-Maisam 
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Then, when I ask her if she thinks it is important to raise the children to be Pale-
stinian, she replies that 
it is important to make the children aware of Palestine. They have to know 
everything. We hope we can leave everything here behind, and go back. 
-Maisam 
These quotes hold some important points: Firstly, for Maisam Palestinianness is 
connected to the land and not to the Palestinian nation. Secondly, she does not make a 
direct connection between the right of return and refugee status. Thirdly, she connects 
Jordanianness to citizenship and refugeeness to statelessness/lack of citizenship and 
not to Palestinianness. This last point supports Takkenbergs suggestion that state-
lessness has been more dominant than refugeeness in negatively affecting the lives of 
individual Palestinians.  
 
Maisam distinguishes between ‘my country’ (baladi) and ‘my homeland’ (watani). 
She connects her citizen’s rights to her Jordanianness, and her attachment to the land 
of Palestine to her Palestinianness. Reem does the same but contrary to Maisam she 
considers herself to be a refugee:  
At heart I am a Palestinian, but it might well be that I die without having seen 
Palestine. We want to go back but at the same time we have a life here, we 
have rights, we are Jordanians. We want to see the land even if it is just for a 
holiday, but this remains a dream. If I have children, I will teach them what 
my parents taught me. We are born and raised here but Palestine is our 
homeland (watanna). We are foreigners everywhere; we are lost. I’m a refu-
gee because I don’t live in my homeland. My children will be refugees and so 
will my grandchildren. It will never end.  
-Reem (26) 
While Maisam connects refugeeness to statelessness, Reem connects it to being a 
Palestinian who by force is not living in Palestine. Thus, for Reem the refugee status 
is collective, and it is logical that for her the refugee status is hereditary. For Maisam 
who does not connect refugee status to the collective right of return, it is not. Budur 
represents a third position. Like Reem, she defines herself both as a refugee and a 
Jordanian but where Reem sees the Palestinians as ‘foreigners everywhere’ and ‘lost’, 
Budur defines Jordanians and Palestinians as ‘the same’:  
We are refugees and so are our children and grandchildren. It will never end. 
I think Jordan can develop into a more homogenous country with a more 
unified population. Jordanians and Palestinians are the same; we are not two 
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countries with two peoples. It is modern border policies that have created this 
idea. 
-Budur (46) 
To underscore the connection between Jordan and Palestine she defines Syrian and 
Lebanese culture as ‘different’, and Jordan as ‘home’:  
I feel at home in Jordan. Jordan is mine, even though Palestine comes first. I 
have been to Lebanon, Syria, the Gulf, but I didn’t feel at home there like I do 
here in Jordan. They do things differently; they are different. If I knew Pale-
stine, if I could travel there, it might be that I still felt that Jordan was my 
country, that I was a stranger in Palestine. My life is here. I’m a Wihdatiyye. 
Wihdat is my team19. 
-Budur 
By defining herself as a Wihdatiyye, a camp dweller, she dissolves the contradiction 
between her Palestinianness and her feeling of being at home in Jordan.  
 
Like Budur, Reem also feels that the Jordanians and Palestinians are closer than other 
Arabs, even though she identifies herself as a refugee and feels ‘lost’: 
People mix here in Jordan, because we live together and know each other 
better than they did when they lived in Palestine. It would be strange to con-
tinue the tradition of marrying someone from your own village; one has to 
look to the future. Nobody cares if you marry a Jordanian. Jordanians and 
Palestinians are closer than other Arabs, like for instance Lebanese and Syri-
ans. We are the same; we share the same culture. 
-Reem (26) 
Maisam, Reem and Budur all connect their Jordanianness to rights and citizenship and 
their Palestinianness to their historical background, the land of Palestine. This is in 
accordance with Davis’ distinction between ‘citizenship’ and ‘nationality’. Maisam 
even makes a distinction between balad (country) and watan (homeland) to clarify 
this difference. However, as they are balancing between the ideology of return and the 
reality of a future in Jordan, some fundamental differences come to light. One diffe-
rence is over what it means to be a refugee and whether or not there is a connection 
between refugeeness and the Right of Return. They also differ to what degree they 
consider Jordan to be home. They agree that Jordan is neither just a waiting place nor 
their homeland (watan) but while Reem considers herself to be a citizen and a 
foreigner, Budur is a citizen and at home. The various ways of solving the ambi-
                                                
19 Referring to the Wihdat Football Club, the pride of Wihdat and of all Palestinians in Jordan.  
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valence of being both a Jordanian citizen and a Palestinian and the contradictory 
identities this creates makes Davis’ clear-cut distinction between citizenship and 
nationality problematic. Kymlicka and Normans understanding of identity and its 
relation to citizenship offers a more suitable framework, as it opens for a more 
flexible understanding of the relationship between national identity and citizenship. 
The usefulness of this perspective becomes even clearer in the analysis of the 
identities of the third generation.  
Our life is here. The youngest generation – Dima, Ratiba, Jamila, Amine and 
Ahlam 
During the first interviews, all with women aged 25 to 50 years, I was told several 
times that if I asked younger women or girls, I would get totally different answers. 
During an interview where several women in their 30s and 40s were present, I asked 
if they had any ideas of where I could find younger informants. They replied by 
asking me why I would want to talk to them:  
If you talk to girls in their late teens, you will see that they think differently 
from us; they are more into clothes, make-up and these things. You will get a 
totally different story. They are not fateful to Palestine like we are; they have 
other ideas. This is because of mass media, cell phones, these things.  
-Samah (33) 
And indeed, the answers I got from the young girls were very different. But while the 
older women look at the young generation as apolitical and unfaithful to the cause and 
see this as an expression of degeneration of Palestinian identity, the young have their 
own ideas of what it means to be a Palestinian and to be fateful to Palestine, and also 
of what it means to be Jordanian.  
 
These differences first became clear to me during an interview with Maisam, as I 
asked her daughter Dima her opinion on her mother’s wish to return to Palestine: 
I want to stay here. There is a difference between the generations when it 
comes to this. Our life is here. I’m not sure I would want to go back even if I 
could. I would probably go and have a look, and then choose the better of the 
two. But I agree with my mother that we are Palestinians and that it is impor-
tant to transmit the stories to our children.  
-Dima (17) 
Dima, like the women of the middle generation, connects her Palestinian identity to 
her family’s roots. However, contrary to the older women she does not mention her 
rights or citizenship as an argument for why she in Jordanian; this is natural to her, 
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not something she needs to explain or excuse. Like Budur, she is not sure that she 
would feel at home in Palestine, but while Budur expresses sadness over the 
possibility that she might be a stranger in Palestine, Dima has a pragmatic and 
practical view on return; she has no desire to move to Palestine. She is more 
concerned about her personal future in Jordan than the common future of the 
Palestinians.  
 
When I ask Jamila (19), Ahlam (28) and Amine (26) how they see their future, they 
talk about work and marriage. Like Dima they neither dream of nor hope for a return 
to Palestine:  
Amine: [My future is] Zaaher wa baaher. Good. 
 
Jamila and Ahlam: You can’t say that. You don’t know how it will be. Who 
knows these things? 
 
Jamila: I’m going to work with my father [as a tailor]. I want to make money. 
I wish for a car, if I had a car I could move around. I can learn how to drive. 
I want money. 
 
Ahlam: Just get married, and you will get the car at once! 
 
All: If you marry someone with money, all your problems are solved.  
 
Ahlam: I want to study to be a teacher. My old job [dental nurse] was very 
tiring, and I made very little. 70-80 JD a month for 12-hour days. It was 
pointless. After paying for transportation, there was nothing left. I tired 
myself out for nothing.  
 
Jamila: It is hard to imagine the future, I’m afraid to be disappointed. 
Anything could happen. It is not easy to find a good job. If you for instance 
work as a beautician and do house calls, you may get into trouble; those who 
do this are not well looked upon. They may have to walk outside in the 
evening, and people will start talking.  
 
The girls from the youngest generation see it as natural that they will spend their lives 
in Jordan. They are not guests and they are not passive or in limbo, they want to shape 
their own future they and believe they will be able to do so. They may see many chal-
lenges in the future, but being Palestinian in Jordan is not one of them.   
 
This clear wish to stay in Jordan does not imply that they no longer consider 
themselves to be Palestinian or that they are willing to waive their Right of Return. 
Although they have other important identities, they are still Palestinian:  
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First I’m Wihdatiyye, then Jordanian, and then maybe thirdly Palestinian. I 
don’t feel that passionate about it. This is where I live, and this is where I 
belong. […] I am born here, and so are my parents. We are Jordanians; we 
have only seen Palestine on TV. […]The important thing is to be able to go 
there, to have the right to see the land and to have the freedom to move back 
and forth. We can live here, that is not the problem.  
-Jamila (19) 
Jamila does not list ‘refugee’ as one of her three most important identities. Still, like 
all the informants, Jamila, Amine and Ahlam agree that they as Palestinians have an 
undisputable right of return to Palestine. The difference between the youngest women 
and the older is that the young clearly express that they have no desire to live in 
Palestine. They are also less interested in the political struggle than their parents’ 
generation, and they do not believe the nakba and the Palestinians becoming refugees 
is something they or their generation should take responsibility for: 
Our parents talk about Palestine, but we are not too interested, it is not that 
important to us. They used to have a textbook at school called al-qadiyyet al-
filastiniyye20, but it is no longer in use. These days they only talk about 
Palestine in geography, and they never talk about the conflict or the Jews. It 
is not our responsibility; older people have to take responsibility for it. We 
are used to the situation as it is now.  
-Jamila 
This does not mean that young Palestinian Jordanians do not look upon themselves as 
Palestinians or that they believe there is no difference between Palestinians and 
Jordanians. The football field is an arena where these differences are addressed: 
There can be problems when Wihdat plays Faisali. At my school [a state 
school, not an UNRWA school] there was a big group fight between the girls 
because of a game. We like each other, but we still fight sometimes, just like 
when Egypt played Algeria21. We even marry them, that is no problem, but we 
think differently, and we are both stubborn. 
-Jamila 
Even though they don’t feel responsible for the struggle for Palestine, the girls see it 
as their duty to transmit the stories and the Palestinian culture. Jamila is for instance 
very eager that I interview her neighbour who remembers both the nakba and the 
history of Wihdat well, and she says she has always been very interested in hearing 
                                                
20 The Palestine cause 
21 This match took place in Sudan on November 18, 2009, just three days before I met Jamila for the 
first time. The match led to considerable violence among supporters, and to diplomatic tensions 
between the two countries. 
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the stories of the old people, and thinks it is important to retell them and keep them 
alive in order not to forget the past. Ratiba agrees to this:  
We are still in contact with our relatives in Palestine. […] This is important 
in order to be updated on what is happening, and for keeping mental contact 
with the land. […] It is important to talk and to tell the stories. The children 
have to know them, and they have to know what is going on now. […] This is 
commitment [intima’], not a duty [wajib]. The children must get the 
awareness about Palestine with their mothers’ milk. 
-Ratiba (31) 
As seen, Jamila at the same time feels Wihdatiyye, Jordanian and Palestinian and she 
allows for the different identities to come into play in different contexts. She is in no 
doubt about being a Jordanian and at the same time Palestinian. Like Maisam, Jamila 
links her Palestinianness to her family’s past, while she links her Jordanianness to her 
rights as a citizen. Contrary to Maisam, her goal is not to return to Palestine. She 
argues that she is Jordanian because she is born in Jordan, and so are her parents. She 
sees it at her birthright to live in the country and plans her future there.  
 
At the same time the members of the youngest generation are fully aware of being 
descendents of refugees. They have deep knowledge of Palestine and take pride in 
being Palestinians. Palestine is addressed regularly in conversation, they ask each 
other where they are from, joke with the different dialects and associate certain places 
with certain behaviour. 
 
Thus, an important difference between the youngest generation and the two older is 
that they do not necessarily desire to live in Palestine. They are at home in Jordan, 
and plan their future there. This does not in any way mean that they are ready to give 
up on the Right of Return; they want the right to choose between staying in Jordan 
and going back to Palestine.  
 
The youngest generation is not in limbo. They are not putting their lives on hold while 
waiting for a return to Palestine. They have clear plans for the future, plans that do not 
involve a possible move to Palestine, but that focuses on their possibilities and 
limitations as citizens in Jordan. Contrary to the women of the middle generation who 
are torn between accepting a future in Jordan and their loyalty to Palestine and the 
cause, the youngest generation have developed a hybrid identity that comprises all the 
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different elements without this turning into a problem of loyalty that needs to be 
solved. 
 
The informants stress the connection between citizenship and rights and being 
Jordanian. With time these rights have become something taken for granted, and this 
has for the younger generations created a feeling of security lacking in the oldest 
generation. This has enabled them to invest in a future in Jordan. Not being stateless 
or second-class citizens is what in their own eyes distinguishes them most from other 
Palestinian refugees in the Middle East. However, there are some limitations to how 
far this feeling of security stretches.  
How “safe” are the Palestinian refugees in Jordan? The limits of 
citizenship 
 
In line with the hegemonic discourse on Palestinian refugees, Kassim claims that “to 
be a Palestinian means not to have a formal citizenship, with the resulting hardships 
that make the Palestinian life in various communities continuously dangerous; the 
legal status of a Palestinian in the Middle East is always in doubt and left to the politi-
cal exigencies of each host country” (Butenschon 2000: 202f). Through numerous 
examples, Sayigh (1998) and Kassim (2000) show that for the Palestinians, displace-
ment and stripping of citizen’s rights has not been one-time experiences, but rather 
something multiple, involving many shades of insecurity and rights violations.  
Arbitrary abolition of citizenship 
Bearing in mind that most of the Palestinian refugees in Jordan have full Jordanian 
citizenship; to what extent should the Jordanian Palestinians worry about losing their 
citizenship? Arbitrary loss of citizenship has certainly affected them, albeit to a lesser 
degree than it has others, especially the refugees in Lebanon. The most serious 
incident for the refugees in Jordan happened in connection with the disengagement 
from the West Bank in 1988. After forty years of being full-scale Jordanian citizens, 
the Palestinians on the West Bank, more than a million people, were declared by King 
Hussein to be “Palestinian citizens”, which in reality rendered them stateless, as no 
Palestinian state existed. This was done regardless of Jordanian law, which has strict 
regulations for revoking a person’s citizenship, and against all principles of inter-
national law (Butenschon 2000: 51, 202, 211). This loss of citizenship also befell 
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Palestinian Jordanians whose family homes were in the West Bank but who were 
residing abroad either on the East Bank or in other countries at the time of the 1967 
war, and who were unable to return to the West Bank after it came under Israeli 
occupation (Nanes 2003: 156f). At the same time, King Hussein declared that the 
disengagement from the West Bank did not have any implications for the Jordanian 
citizens with residency on the East Bank, independent of their background. Regard-
less of this incident, there is little to fear for the East Bank Palestinians as a group. As 
long as they are denied the Right of Return they have nowhere to go, and irrespective 
of this, Jordan would hardly manage without them. The Palestinians are deeply 
involved in the private sector and the absolute majority of the inhabitants of the 
capital Amman are Palestinians (al-Hamarneh 2002a: 173). As Imm Anwar puts it: 
We are more useful for them than they are to us. We are the oil of Jordan. However, 
from 200422 to 2008, Jordan has withdrawn Jordanian nationality from over 2,700 
Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin, in an arbitrary manner and in violation of 
Jordan’s nationality law of 1954. This has affected people from all social classes and 
occupations, and there seems to be no discernable pattern to who is affected. (HRW 
2010). Bearing in mind the Palestinian refugees’ history of expulsion, it is likely that 
incidents like these can create a general feeling of unease among the Palestinian 
Jordanians, and one should in general not underestimate an underlying feeling of 
being at risk of losing their citizenship in Jordan. One should also not forget that this 
is a constant reality for 3 %23 of the Jordanian population; the Palestinians of Gazan 
origin who do not have citizenship. 
Consequences of a future peace agreement –keeping the right to remain  
The Right of Return for all Palestinians who fled in 1948 and their descendants was 
supported by UN General Assembly resolution 194 in December 1948 (Dumper 2006: 
2). Yet, an often mentioned problem for the Palestinian refugees is their previous and 
present position as pawns in the negotiations between Israel and the PLO, later the 
Palestinian Authorities (PA). Khalili points out that “[a]s the asymmetrical peace 
negotiations between the PLO and Israel progressed, refugees increasingly feared that 
recognition of their rights – among them the right of return – would be “traded” for 
some kind of state in the occupied territories” (Khalili 2004:7). However, this is not 
                                                
22 No statistics are available prior to 2004.  
23 According to Arneberg 1997 
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the only point of insecurity that might appear with an eventual peace agreement. Also 
the right to stay in one’s host country, the right not to return, might be at stake. This is 
especially the case for the Palestinians in Syria, where the law explicitly states that 
Palestinian refugees can stay until the conflict is settled, and for the Palestinians in 
Lebanon, who are considered to be foreigners under Lebanese law. Of those refugees 
who ended up in Arab states only the ones who came to Jordan were granted the right 
to remain in the country they fled to (Nanes 2003: 149). However, this right has some 
potential limits. Since the League of Arab states only allows for citizens of their 
member states to be citizen of one Arab state, a consequence of a peace treaty might 
be that the refugees would have to choose individually or be chosen for collectively 
whether to stay in Jordan or return to Palestine: 
For many, return was and is not negotiable; it was and is a principle and a 
right which no one can take away. It would be up to each individual whether 
he or she would like to employ that right. The question of a collective right of 
return to a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza would, to many, mean 
that the refugees would be made refugees again (Schulz 2003: 210). 
Shuruq makes the connection between collective return and becoming refugees again 
even clearer:  
Our future is here, not in Palestine, we will never return. I would like to go 
back to have a look, but we will stay here. Jordan is our future. And anyway, 
people in Palestine wouldn’t like for us to come back, they would have 
become angry, and we would be suffering the same fate as in 1948 and end 
up in camps, all over again. 
-Shuruq (32) 
However, as seen above, it is highly unlikely that the Jordanian state would be 
interested in losing a majority of its population, it is more realistic that it would be the 
Palestinian non-citizens; the 120 000 stateless Gazans who would be forced to return 
(Brynen 2006: 67). A more realistic outcome of an eventual peace treaty for the 
Palestinians who hold Jordanian citizenship, and one that is in accordance with the 
Jordanian nationalists’ wishes for the Palestinian population in Jordan would be that 
Jordan will force the Palestinians to choose between maintaining their Jordanian 
citizenship and claim Palestinian citizenship with resident privileges in Jordan. 
Through this option they would lose their right of participation in Jordan’s political 
life by article 5, which forbids party members to claim non-Jordanian nationality 
(Robinson 1998: 395). 
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Conclusion  
 
While the oldest informants fit the image of the Palestinian refugee as it is presented 
by the hegemonic discourse, the youngest do not. This chapter shows how the 
Palestinians in Jordan have gone through a process of change. From having an 
identity as Palestinian refugees in exile they have become Palestinian and Jordanian, 
and the youngest generation seems to have developed a hybrid identity. This 
influences the different generations’ attitudes to the Right of Return. All generations 
agree that they as Palestinians have the right of returning to Palestine, but as opposed 
to the two older generations, the youngest do not wish to personally give up their lives 
in Jordan and return to Palestine.  
 
The informants’ argumentation indicates that the citizenship and identity-discourse 
also has had influence in the refugee camps. By insisting that they are Jordanian 
citizens with equal rights and at the same time defining themselves as Palestinians 
they defy the Jordanian nationalist claim that one in order to be a true Jordanian has to 
renounce one’s Palestinian identity. This shows that the polarisation between the two 
groups and the nationalist demands of loyalty not necessarily must lead to an increa-
sed feeling of being a minority. On the contrary, it can strengthen the Palestinians’ 
citizenship through their active use of it to claim or defend their citizen’s rights.  
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Chapter 6: Marrying a stranger – what was once considered 
to be negative is now positive 
 
The inhabitants of Wihdat Camp organise their lives around the family, and the 
interests of the individual comes after the interests of the family as a whole. This is a 
common social pattern in the Middle East, known as ‘familism’. Familism should 
according to Sayigh not be viewed as a cultural trait, but rather as an adaptive 
response to political and social insecurity, something that for instance can be a result 
of state oppression or the opposite, the absence of a state all together. (Quoted in 
Singerman 1995: 48) In societies where familism is prevalent, marriage as the 
objective of reproducing the family is the key to understanding many other issues, 
among them the ways people react to political and social change (Singerman 1995: 
15).  Thus, familism is not a static and unchangeable system; it is a strategic adaption 
to changing social and political circumstances. In this chapter I will argue that the 
hybrid identity and increased feeling of belonging to Jordan among the inhabitants of 
Wihdat manifests itself through changes in marriage patterns. There seems to be a 
movement away from family and village endogamy and a rise in the frequency of 
exogamous marriage. I believe that endogamy is less preferred than before because its 
strategic value has lessened with an increased integration into Jordan.  
Palestine is not forgotten. The wedding of Budur’s daughter  
 
One of the first things that happened when I came to Wihdat, before I had conducted a 
single interview, was that I was invited to the wedding of Budur’s daughter, Iman. 
Budur is a community leader, and holds an important position in one of the social 
service centres in Wihdat. She grew up in the camp, but her family moved out a few 
years ago and they now live in a newer, predominantly Palestinian neighbourhood in 
East Amman. The family belongs to the lower middle class, and like they often do for 
this class, the wedding takes place in a shopping centre in West Amman. 
 
The first part of the wedding is dominated by symbols of Palestine. When I arrive, the 
couple is sitting on a throne in the reception area. The bride is dressed in a white 
wedding dress, the groom in a black suit. A group of hired male wedding singers and 
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dancers dressed in traditional Palestinian peasant attire and carrying sticks are 
standing in a half-circle in front of them, dancing dabke and singing songs about 
Palestine:  
Who forgets Palestine? Who forgets Yafa, who forgets Haifa! Mother, 
mother, come and see! The groom is a Palestinian! He is from Yafa! 
 
The guests, both men and women, are cheering and singing along, replying to the 
political slogans shouted by the dancers.  
 
After this session, which takes about an hour, all the women head upstairs to the 
reception hall, joined by the wedding couple after some time. Upstairs there is 
dancing, cakes and soft drinks, but gone are the Palestinian songs, dance and symbols.  
 
As seen in the previous chapter, even though the younger generations expect to stay in 
Jordan and see it as their country, they have not lost their Palestinian identity, and 
Palestine is not forgotten. This becomes obvious at the wedding. Through the 
performance of these rituals, Palestine is given a prominent place. Connerton states 
that although rites tend to occur at special places and at fixed times, like for instance 
at weddings, they also permeate  
non-ritual behaviour and mentality. […]. They are held to be meaningful 
because rites have significance with respect to a set of further non-ritual 
actions, to the whole life of the community. Rites have the capacity to give 
value and meaning to the life of those who perform them. All rites are 
repetitive, and repetition automatically implies continuity with the past 
(Connerton 1989: 44f). 
I believe that the rituals at the wedding are not only manifestations of a continuation 
between the past and the present; they are also political acts. Khalili considers 
commemorative events in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, whether 
organized by states or at the grass-roots level, to almost always have a political 
dimension: 
For [the refugees], to recount and commemorate their belonging to the village 
is a way of declaring membership in the nation, concretizing their belonging 
to the Palestinian polity in the face of possible exclusion from it. In this sense, 
the commemorative practices are forward-looking political acts intended by 
the refugees as critiques of their leadership and their current social and 
political predicament (Khalili 2004: 18). 
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Thus, despite their growing sense of belonging to Jordan, the Jordanian Palestinians 
have not forgotten their past. Rather, they reproduce it and link it to the present 
through rituals like those I saw at the wedding. The Right of Return is not abandoned, 
and there is no sign that it will be so in the foreseeable future.  
Exogamy is linked to a future in Jordan  
 
Four days after the wedding, in an interview with Budur where her husband was 
partly present, she explained her choice of husbands for her daughters:  
Because of the gossip and the lack of privacy it brings, I consciously did not 
choose men from our village for my daughters. […] One of my daughters is 
married to a man from Yafa, one is married to a man from Hebron, and the 
third to a Jordanian. The men are all born here in Jordan. The Jordanian is 
really from Ramallah, but he is Jordanian, that is, his family came before 
1948. […] I want good men for my daughters; why should I choose a bad 
one? […] I demand a high maher24. A good start of a marriage is important, 
my daughters should be able to relax and feel safe. I always ask the men what 
they earn. Why shouldn’t I? 
-Budur (46) 
Regardless of the strong positive focus on Palestine and the right of return at the 
wedding, when choosing marriage partners for her daughters, Budur gives issues of 
economy and security priority over the ethnicity of the groom. She and her husband 
also emphasise the need for the family to enhance their network in Jordan, and how 
this is connected to marriage:  
Budur: Here in Jordan we mix. We don’t care where people come from 
anymore. It is natural that things change; one can’t just go on like before. 
This is development.  
 
Husband: No, that is not the reason. The change has happened because we 
had to flee from Palestine.  
 
Budur: That is true. The exodus [hijra] changed everything. The traditions 
have changed because of the exodus. […] A reason why we are now marrying 
our children to people from different places is the importance of enhancing 
our networks. The escape from Palestine disrupted our old networks, and 
here in Jordan it is useful to have contacts from many different places. What 
was once considered to be negative [exogamy] is now positive. 
 
                                                
24 Bride price 
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This illustrates what I find to be a trend in Wihdat camp; an increasing number of 
marriages between strangers25. I addition to an increase in actual marriages between 
strangers, I also find a strong preference for this kind of marriage. This, however, 
does not necessarily mean that exogamy is the normal practice. Of all the people I 
collected information about, 22 were married exogamously, and 21 endogamously. 
However, when the numbers are broken down to generations26, there is a clear 
overweight of younger people being married to strangers and older people being 
married to a relative or someone from the same village: 
 
 Married to 
cousin 
Married to 
relative other 
than cousin 
Married to s.o. 
from the same 
village 
Total 
endogamous 
marriage 
Married to a 
stranger 
Old 4 3 6 13 6 
Young 4 2 2 8 16 
 
Although I do not have sufficient data to claim any statistical evidence, these num-
bers, together with people’s stated preferences of exogamous marriage, suggests that a 
change in attitudes is taking place. Among my informants this is followed by a clear 
ideological preference for exogamous marriage, supported by a variation of argu-
ments.  
 
Maisam is married to her cousin on her father’s side. She considers her wedding, 
which took place in 1986, to have been  
very traditional. We met for the first time at the engagement. […] Our 
grandfather decided and everybody else, including my husband and me, had 
to comply. We didn’t think about it much; it was a natural thing. At that time, 
everybody got married that way. It was important for our families that we 
were from the same place. At that time it was absolutely preferred, it was in 
accordance with their habits and traditions. Things are totally different now. 
We both have younger brothers and sisters, and none of them have married 
the way we did. They have married at an older age, and most of them outside 
the family and village.  
-Maisam (41) 
Maisam thinks that the main reason for the change is strategic: 
                                                
25 By ’stranger’ I mean someone who is not a relative and not from the same village in Palestine. 
26 For this purpose I have joined the oldest and the middle generation into one, as all the representatives 
of these generations were married before the end of the 1980s. 
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The Nakba and the hijra is very important when it comes to these changes. It 
is important for us to enhance our networks. Marrying strangers is a good 
way to get new contacts.  
-Maisam 
Ideological support for exogamy – development, health and religion 
The informants give strong ideological support to exogamous marriage, something 
that supports my assumption that there is an actual change happening in the marriage 
patterns of the inhabitants of Wihdat. The following section will elaborate on how the 
informants connect exogamous marriage to development and enlightenment and 
endogamous marriage to backwardness. Imm Anwar thinks the rate of endogamous 
marriage is higher in Palestine, and connects this to the lack of mobility there:  
Marriage patterns change as the world changes. This is nothing new. People 
study, they learn, and this changes everything. Cousin marriages are not so 
common anymore. It is more common in Palestine than it is here. I think this 
is because people are less mobile there, that they can’t move around that 
much. It is the situation that creates and changes traditions.    
-Imm Anwar (62) 
Knowledge about health and genetics is an important argument for exogamy. Maisam, 
like several other informants, connects this to Islam:  
There are several reasons for the change [marriage at higher age, and 
outside family and/or village]. One thing of course, is mass media and 
education. This has brought new thoughts. Another reason is that we know 
more about genetics and hereditary deceases. The religion says one should 
marry from outside, that fresh blood is important.  
-Maisam 
Endogamous marriage is mostly connected to backwardness and lack of education, 
for instance to the lack of knowledge of the difference between tradition and religion. 
During a visit to Jarash camp, two teenage girls gave me a tour. They explained the 
layout of the camp, pointing out the different neighbourhoods. When we reached the 
outskirts of the camp, they pointed down a street, telling me why they considered 
people in this area to be especially stupid and backwards:  
They still marry their kids off to relatives. It is not a good thing. They look 
strange. It is important to marry outside the family, it says in the Quran. It is 
better for your health. These people don’t know the difference between 
religion and tradition. 
 
Ratiba is the only informant that connects endogamy to something positive; safety 
through predictability, but she also qualifies this with the health argument:  
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It is better to marry strangers, because in that way it is easier to avoid 
hereditary deceases. The Prophet says it is better. If one is related, both may 
be carriers of the same decease. If relatives marry, they have to take a test, 
just in case. People who marry relatives do it because it feels safer. Since the 
families know each other better, it is easier to predict if the marriage will 
work.  
-Ratiba (31) 
 
There is clearly a strong ideological preference for exogamous marriage among the 
informants, and one can also see a tendency of increasing exogamous marriage. In the 
following section I will compare these findings to other research done on marriage 
patterns among Palestinian refugees. 
Marriage patterns among Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Gaza and 
Lebanon 
 
Findings from the mid to late 1990s show a clear tendency of family and/or village 
endogamy among Palestinian refugees both in Jordan, Lebanon and in Gaza: 
 
Kalimat and Hanssen-Bauer (1998) find that there in general is a tendency among 
Jordanians for village endogamy, the “reproduction of the village”, i.e. that people are 
transmitting the old family patterns by marrying a close relative and that patrilocality 
is still dominant. Findings show that Palestinian refugees in Jordan are on the same, 
or a higher level than the general population when it comes to the reproduction of the 
village. They also show that there is a strong tendency to marry within one’s own 
social group; refugee marry refugee, displaced marry displaced and so on. Only ten 
percent of the marriages in Jordan are between refugee and non-refugee.  
 
According to Ugland (2003), family endogamy is still present, but declining among 
the Palestinian camp refugees in Lebanon. 33 % of all marriages are between cousins 
or other members of the same hamula27, while in the remaining 67 % of the 
marriages, the spouses are not related. Village endogamy, however, is common, and 
marriage between partners with the same refugee status even more so. 89 % of 
                                                
27 A patrilineal descent group composed of all the members related biologically to the common great-
grand-father, or of members who have related themselves socially to certain hamule by fictive 
relatedness (Al-Haj 1995: 316). 
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married spouses have the same refugee status, and almost 50 % are born in the same 
place, to families that come from the same place in Lebanon or Palestine.  
 
Tuastad (1997) finds a high frequency of intra-lineage (and intra-class) marriages in 
Bureij Camp in Gaza. As many as two thirds marry a refugee descended from the 
same village, and there is a low frequency of marriages between fellahin (peasants) 
and madanin (city dwellers)28. As Kalimat and Hanssen-Bauer, he concludes that the 
old pattern of village endogamy is being reproduced in Bureij.  
 
It seems that what Jaber, Kalimat and Hanssen-Bauer, Ugland and Tuastad have 
found in Jordan, Lebanon and Gaza contradict my findings. However, three important 
factors that will be presented below qualify this. The first is how endogamy is 
connected to refugee identity.  
Refugeeness, endogamy and the preservation of memory  
Tuastad suggests that continued village endogamy in Bureij might be an expression of 
a strongly felt identity towards the original village. By marrying a relative or someone 
from the same village, one reproduces the social order that existed before the Nakba, 
and at the same time conserves the memories of the past. In this way the refugee 
identity is kept intact:  
The traditions, codes of conduct, rituals, dialects, history, local idiosyncratic 
knowledge, as well as production of myths and legends that are transmitted 
through generations, locating the refugees in space and time, providing them 
with roots, are strengthened when both parents originate from the same 
village. Interpreted this way the high proportion of marriages of partners 
originating from the same village may imply that memory of the pre-48-war 
home is kept alive, as home as a social and cultural state is reproduced in new 
physical environments (Tuastad 1997: 112).  
Sayigh also connects endogamous marriage to keeping the refugee identity alive:  
In Jordan, with the highest absolute number of refugees in camps (252,089), 
village and family endogamy is still the rule rather than the exception. Hana 
Jaber notes village endogamy in Wihdat camp, linking it to the desire to 
conserve memory of origins. Whether based in hierarchy or in local mores, 
status boundaries work strongly to reproduce 'the refugee" as political/social 
/cultural figure, embodying a powerful collective history of oppression and 
                                                
28 These categories do not refer to people’s current occupation or place of abode, but to their families’ 
historical background in Palestine. 
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resistance. Pride in the "refugee identity" – as "strugglers," as "more Pale-
stinian," as "refusing to disappear" – renders their marginality a latent form of 
power (Sayigh 1998: 23). 
Jaber found that in the 30 families she examined in Wihdat camp, most marriages 
were not village endogamous, but happened within the family group (the jamâ’a): 
this term [the jamâ’a] does not refer to Palestine, to religion, or even to 
village of origin, but to the family. This kind of ties concerns all the 
generations of the house, including the youngest. Sometimes the matrimonial 
alliances will extend to the balad, which means the village, but very few 
marriages are entered into outside this framework. We only registered one 
family where the girls were not married off quite young, and where the 
children were married “according to their choice (Jaber 1996: 45, my 
translation). 
Jaber interprets this ‘tightening the cord between those who share the memory’ as the 
refugees’ wish to preserve the memory of Palestine.  
 
If endogamy is indeed connected to refugeeness and the preservation of memory like 
the evidence above suggests, it is logical that as the feeling of refugeeness grows less 
acute the need for endogamous marriage diminishes. Evidence presented in previous 
chapters indicates that in Wihdat this has been the case since Jaber conducted her 
fieldwork in 1996. Thus, the difference between Jaber’s and my findings may be due 
to the difference in time. However, as both Jaber’s and my sample is too small to have 
any statistical value, this is hard to establish with certainty.  
Differences between stated preferences and actual choice of spouse 
The second factor that qualifies a possible contradiction between my findings and the 
other evidence presented above is the difference between stated preferences and 
actual choice of marriage partner found by both Both Kalimat/Hansen-Bauer and 
Ugland. This may be an indication of an ongoing change:  
[t]he observed levels of in-marriage agree only to some extent with answers 
given to questions regarding the preferred marriage type. […] It is not clear if 
the difference between observed and preferred marriages is due to a recent 
shift in opinion, or if the complex choices involved in finding a spouse make 
the outcomes different than the preferences (Kalimat and Hanssen-Bauer 
1998: 274). 
Ugland found no specific preference for endogamy among the Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon, but found that individuals over 50 years prefer endogamy twice as often as 
the average.  
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In comparing preferences for marriage partners and actual types of marriage 
partners, we find that more marriages are entered into between cousins than 
that which the respondents report to prefer. Part of the reason for this may be 
that attitudes towards cousin marriages are changing (Ugland 2003: 218). 
Lack of other options 
The third factor is, as Tuastad suggests; that continued endogamy is not necessarily a 
result of actual choice. It might also be a result of a lack of contact with people other 
than those from the same family or village: 
Whether this is a result of a preference, in the sense that refugees consciously 
prefer to marry someone from the same village in pre-48 Palestine, or is a 
result of a lack of new contacts outside the lineages and original villages, the 
patterns have implications that are important for the reproduction of refugee 
identity (Tuastad 1997: 112). 
Thus, even though it is difficult to establish if an actual change in marriage preference 
is taking place, there are some strong indications in favour of this. Kalimat and Bauer 
Hansen and Ugland have found evidence that suggests such a change in their quantita-
tive data from Jordan and Lebanon, and judging from my findings, there is strong 
preference for exogamous marriage in Wihdat.  
Conclusion  
 
There is a clear preference for exogamous marriage among the informants, and there 
also seems to be a change in the actual marriage pattern, with an increasing number of 
exogamous marriages. The informants link the preference for exogamous marriage to 
a belief that as Jordanian citizens they and their children will remain in Jordan, and 
that by arranging marriages between strangers they will expand and strengthen their 
social network there. The informants regard these changes as something positive; as a 
consequence of enlightenment and development, and they use religious and medical 
arguments to support them ideologically.   
 
However, stateless refugees in Lebanon and in Jarash camp in Jordan who live with a 
great deal of uncertainty regarding their future also express an increased preference 
for exogamous marriage. This seems to contradict the assumption that preference for 
exogamous marriage is linked to a feeling of security provided by citizenship. Thus, it 
is possible that the change in marriage preference from endogamous to exogamous 
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marriage is a general trend in the Middle East, and not something specific for the 
Palestinians in Jordan29.   
 
Regardless of whether the changes in preference and practice among the Palestinians 
in Wihdat is a result of their Jordanian citizenship or part of a general trend in the 
Middle East, exogamous marriages help to strengthen the Palestinian refugees’ attach-
ment to Jordan. At the same time as they serve to strengthen the families’ networks in 
Jordan, they weaken the old ties to Palestine. In this way the preference for exo-
gamous marriage contributes to strengthening the Palestinian Jordanians’ attachment 
to Jordan and to develop further their hybrid identity.  
                                                
29 To my knowledge there are no comprehensive statistics available on this issue. Neither the Lebanese, 
Jordanian, Israeli nor the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics publish information on relations 
between spouses before marriage.  
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Conclusion: Jordan – coming together or falling apart? 
 
A hybrid Palestinian-Jordanian identity is developing among the Palestinians living in 
refugee camps in Jordan. This identity is manifested in changes in marriage patterns 
and in attitudes to the Right of Return. While Palestinians from the oldest generation 
define themselves as Palestinians and still hope for a return to Palestine for them-
selves and their descendants, members of the youngest generation prefer to live their 
lives in Jordan, and they define themselves as both Jordanian and Palestinian. A 
change of preference from endogamous to exogamous marriage for the purpose of 
enhancing the families’ networks in Jordan contributes to strengthening this identity.  
 
Those informants who express a hybrid identity connect their Jordanianness to their 
citizenship and citizen’s rights, and do not see any contradiction between being 
Jordanian citizens and Palestinian nationals. This indicates that even though the citi-
zenship and identity-discourse in the 1990s mainly was an elite phenomenon, it has 
had influence on all classes of Palestinians in Jordan. Thus, at the same time as the 
discourse contributed to increased polarisation between the two groups it also led to a 
strengthening of the Palestinians’ Jordanian identity.   
 
However, this strengthening of the Palestinians’ Jordanian identity will not in itself 
lead to decreased polarisation between the two groups in the future. It is not sufficient 
that the Palestinians define themselves as citizens of Jordan and that they have deve-
loped a hybrid Palestinian-Jordanian identity. Their identity must also be accepted by 
the East Bank Jordanians as a valid variant of Jordanian identity.  
 
One factor that makes this acceptance difficult to achieve is the unresolved conflict 
between Israel and the Palestinians, and then especially the key issue of the status of 
the refugees. The Palestinian refugees have a right to return to Palestine and to 
compensation. Even though individual refugees may no longer see return as a rea-
listic, and often not even as a desired solution, they will not give up the right of return 
as principle as long as there is no acceptable solution to the conflict. Also, as long as 
this solution has not been found, the Palestinian side in the conflict, today represented 
politically by the Palestinian Authorities (PA) will not give up one of their most 
   80 
important bargaining chips; the refugees. Thus, as long as the ‘refugee problem’ 
remains unresolved, the East Jordanian nationalists’ will be able to continue arguing 
that the Palestinians in Jordan are visitors and as guests should not be given the same 
rights and opportunities as the ‘real’ Jordanians. A solution to the ‘refugee problem’ 
will take the strength out of the nationalist argumentation and necessitate a new stage 
in the process of defining Jordanian identity. 
  
This does not mean that there is a causal connection between the solution of the 
‘refugee problem’ and a more homogenous Jordanian state; there are also several non-
conflict related features that may contribute to a continued polarisation.  
 
One of these features is a strong East Bank Jordanian resistance to reforms that aim at 
giving the Palestinians greater access to the Jordanian polity. It is this resistance that 
was expressed at the cancelled Faisali–Wihdat match in July 2009. When the Faisali 
fans cheered “divorce her you father of Hussein, and we’ll marry you to two of ours”, 
referring to Queen Rania who is of Palestinian decent, they challenged the regime to 
publicly choose sides and through this threatened to upset the regime’s survival 
strategy of balancing between the two communities. The diplomatic cable sent from 
Amman establishes that the insults “strike […] at the core of Jordanian identity 
politics”, as it challenges the regime’s attempts to create an all-comprising Jordanian 
identity. Further, the cable connects the increasingly explicit and provocative Faisali 
slogans to the East Bank Jordanians’ frustrations with “the increasing pressures for 
reform that will inevitably lessen their near-monopoly on political and social power”. 
Without the implementations of these reforms, it will be difficult for the regime to 
reach its aim of developing a hybrid Jordan identity.  
 
Another feature that if it is not suspended will contribute to continued polarisation is 
the arbitrary abolition of citizenship that some Palestinian Jordanians have been sub-
jected to. A lack of trust in the permanence of their citizenship might weaken the 
incentive to claim their right to take part in shaping Jordanian society and the public 
debate. However, in connection with this it is important to keep in mind that unless 
the process of political liberalisation is revitalised, the possibilities for taking part in 
shaping the future of Jordan as active citizens are limited for most Jordanians, 
regardless of origin. 
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Appendix 1: Categories of Jordanian personal status 
documents and their appurtenant rights30 
 
Origin Residence 
 
Kind of 
Passport 
Family 
Book   
Card of 
Crossing   Accessibility to services 
Jordanian - 
East Banker 
Permanent 
residency in 
Jordan  
 
Five year 
passport with 
the National 
ID Number.  
yes - Full access 
Jordanian - 
Palestinian of 
1948 
Permanent 
residency in 
Jordan 
 
Five-year 
passport with 
national ID 
NUMBER.  
yes -  Full access 
Jordanian - 
Palestinian of 
1967 
Permanent 
residency in 
Jordan 
 
Five year 
passport with 
National ID 
Number. 
yes 
Yellow Card - 
family 
reunification 
Full access 
Jordanian- 
Palestinian of 
1967 
Permanent 
residency in 
the West Bank 
Five-year 
passport 
without 
national ID 
number 
No 
family 
book  
Green Card 
 
Work needs a work 
permit, university 
education payment in 
foreign fees, ownership 
with the approval of a 
ministerial council  
Jordanian-
Palestinian 
from 
Jerusalem 
Permanent 
residency in 
Jerusalem 
Five-year 
passport 
without 
national ID 
number 
No Green Card 
 
Work needs a work 
permit, university 
education payment in 
foreign fees, ownership 
with the approval of a 
ministerial council  
Palestinians of 
Gaza 
Permanent 
residency in 
Jordan 
Two-year 
temporary 
passport 
No 
In case of 
family 
reunification - 
Blue Card 
 
Work needs a work 
permit, university 
education payment in 
foreign fees, ownership 
with the approval of a 
ministerial council  
Palestinians of 
the West Bank 
or Gaza Strip 
Permanent 
residency in 
West Bank or 
Gaza Strip 
Palestinian 
authority 
passport (LP) 
No Permission to enter 
 
Treated like any Arab in 
Jordan: as long as there 
is a valid residency they 
can access services 
permitted for foreigners  
 
                                                
30 Taken from FMO Research Guide 
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Acronyms and glossary of Arabic words 
 
CSC  Camp Service Committee 
 
DPA  Department of Palestinian Affairs 
 
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross 
 
JD  Jordanian Dinar. Equals 1,4 USD 
 
NGO  Non Governmental Organisation 
 
PA  Palestinian Authorities 
 
PLO  Palestine Liberation Organisation 
 
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in 
the Near East 
 
al-aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, one of the most important holy places in Islam 
 
balad  Country, as opposed to homeland 
 
dabke Traditional Palestinian dance 
 
fellah Peasant, village dweller 
 
hamule Clan, patrilineal association 
 
lajne  Synonym for the CSC and the DPA used by the resident of the camp 
 
madani Person of urban origin, not Bedouin or from the village 
 
maher  Bride price 
 
mukhtar Traditionally a village headman, a position first established by Otto-
man authorities as their administrative representative in the villages. In 
the Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan it is used more loosely as a 
term for important leaders in the camps. 
 
al-nakba ‘The catastrophe’. The Arabic word for the making of the Palestinian 
refugee problem in 1948. 
 
wasta  A contact, a person connected to people with power 
 
watan  Homeland 
 
wihdatiyye Woman from Wihdat camp 
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